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Jared A. Ellias* and Robert J. Stark** 
On the eve of the financial crisis, a series of Delaware court 
decisions resulted in a radical change in law: creditors would no 
longer have the kind of common law protections from opportunism that 
helped protect their bargains for the better part of two centuries. In 
this Article, we argue that Delaware’s shift materially altered the way 
large firms approach financial distress, which is now characterized by 
a level of chaos and rent-seeking unchecked by norms that formerly 
restrained managerial opportunism. We refer to the new status quo as 
“bankruptcy hardball.” It is now routine for distressed firms to engage 
in tactics that harm some creditors for the benefit of other 
stakeholders, often in violation of contractual promises and basic 
principles of corporate finance. The fundamental problem is that 
Delaware’s change in law was predicated on the faulty assumption 
that creditors are fully capable of protecting their bargains during 
periods of distress with contracts and bankruptcy law. Through a 
series of case studies, we show how the creditor’s bargain is often, 
contrary to that undergirding assumption, an easy target for 
opportunistic repudiation and, in turn, dashed expectations once 
distress sets in. We further argue that the Delaware courts paved the 
way for scorched earth corporate governance. Fortunately, judges can 
help fix the problem with more rigorous application of existing legal 
doctrines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In late 2017, PetSmart Inc. (PetSmart), one of the world’s leading retailers 
of pet supplies, found itself in deep financial distress.1 The company’s financial 
troubles originated with an ill-fated leveraged buyout and acquisition that 
burdened PetSmart with billions of debt in the form of secured bank loans and 
unsecured bonds.2 The leveraged buyout and acquisition did not go well. 
PetSmart’s bond debt began trading at steep discounts, suggesting that traders in 
the bond market viewed the firm as insolvent.3 The textbook account of corporate 
governance would suggest that PetSmart’s board of directors would respond to 
this financial distress by seeking to improve the underlying business or, perhaps, 
by filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to maximize the value of the firm for the 
benefit of creditors, who would collect before PetSmart’s shareholders. Instead, 
PetSmart’s board authorized a transaction that seems shocking for a firm in its 
situation: it took nearly $2 billion out of the reach of creditors, distributing about 
$900 million to its shareholders, and placing $750 million in a subsidiary that 
was not obligated to repay its $9 billion in debt.4 
The PetSmart scenario is emblematic of a paradigm shift in how boards of 
directors now approach financial distress.5 For most of American history, boards 
of directors were counseled to manage distressed firms with an eye towards 
 
 1. See Eliza Ronalds-Hannon & Lauren Coleman-Lochner, The Most Expensive Takeover in 
Retail is Drowning in Debt, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-25/yielding-21-in-bond-market-the-no-1-retail-
lbo-is-in-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/HA9N-ZPQ8]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Eliza Ronalds-Hannon & Katherine Doherty, PetSmart Moves Part of Chewy.com Out 
of Creditors’ Reach, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-
04/petsmart-is-said-to-move-chewy-stake-in-j-crew-style-transfer/ [https://perma.cc/H9UB-3YH2]. 
 5. Reporting in the popular media has also noticed that something has changed, but this Article 
is the first to describe the entirety of the phenomenon. See, e.g., Soma Biswas, Deal to Save J. Crew 
from Bankruptcy Angers High-Yield Debt Investors, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/deal-to-save-j-crew-from-bankruptcy-angers-high-yield-debt-investors-
1506011065/ [https://perma.cc/YDG6-UXXU] (discussing a transaction that pushed “junior 
bondholders to the front of the line of creditors, ahead of term-loan holders, who were in a superior 
position . . .” and increasing fear on the part of debt investors that aggressive interpretations of credit 
contracts are undermining the debt markets); Sujeet Indap, Private Equity Firms’ Lawyers Get Creative, 
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3a42e50e-7e23-11e7-9108-edda0bcbc928/ 
[https://perma.cc/FYT3-VWS4] (“Every [private equity] firm is adopting more aggressive approaches. 
Some sponsors will win, some will lose.”); Nathan Vardi, Leon Black’s Apollo Global Management 
Keeps Winning Battles and Outmaneuvering Creditors, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/08/28/leon-blacks-apollo-global-management-keeps-
winning-battles-and-outmaneuvering-creditors/#5d7c2da2785f/ [https://perma.cc/AS2N-CKAE] 
(noting that a leading private equity firm is routinely winning battles with creditors, whose claims are 
legally senior to shareholders). One prominent investment banker described 2018 as being characterized 
by “the brazen asset stripping [the rerouting of assets away from creditors] that [large firms] have gotten 
away with – mind boggling!” See End of the Year Followup, PETITION (Dec. 19, 2018) (quoting J. 
Scott Victor), https://petition.substack.com/p/petitions-2018-deal-of-the-year [https://perma.cc/S4CS-
Y4Y3]. 
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maximizing firm value for the benefit of creditors.6 In today’s world, by contrast, 
many firms pursue strategies intended to hurt creditors or, if possible, avoid 
bankruptcy for the benefit of shareholders. It is quite revealing that, after 
PetSmart removed nearly $2 billion from the reach of creditors, the trading price 
of its bonds actually increased in value.7 The bondholders who were still harmed 
by the transaction likely breathed a sigh of relief because they had feared far 
worse.8 Although unthinkable only a few years ago, in today’s environment, a 
distressed firm’s redistribution of nearly $2 billion away from its creditors is seen 
as unexpectedly generous to those same creditors because its private equity 
owner did not help itself to more. 
In this Article, we argue that the norms restraining managers of distressed 
firms from declaring all-out war on creditors have been fading since the financial 
crisis.9 Managers are now playing what we call “bankruptcy hardball” with 
creditors.10 To be sure, it is well established that the interests of creditors, 
managers, and shareholders diverge when a firm becomes distressed.11 The 
managers of a distressed firm can use their control to select from a range of 
options with important distributional ramifications for the firm’s stakeholders.12 
 
 6. Justice Story pioneered this area of jurisprudence in the early 1800s, first as a district court 
judge, see Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 435–40 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No 17,944), and then on the 
Supreme Court, see Mumma v. Potomac Co., 33 U.S. 281, 281–87 (1834). In short, his view was that 
managers of an insolvent firm operate the company as a “trust fund” for the benefit of creditors, and this 
view became known as the “trust fund doctrine.” For a fuller discussion of the evolution of the trust fund 
doctrine into modern fiduciary duty shifting, see generally Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1332 (2007) (summarizing 
the transition from trust fund doctrine to duty shifting). 
 7. See Ronalds-Hannon & Doherty, supra note 4. 
 8. See id. 
 9. In another example, the private equity owner of Caesar’s, the gaming conglomerate, decided 
to strip the firm of its best assets to gain bargaining power over creditors should the firm ultimately file 
for bankruptcy. In an internal presentation, employees of the private equity owner justified the transfer,  
later found by a court-appointed examiner to be a fraudulent transfer, as “increasing . . . [our] ‘war chest’ 
[to fight creditors with] upon a potential restructuring.” See Final Report of Examiner Richard J. Davis 
at 343, In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., 561 B.R. 441 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 15-01145). 
 10. The title was inspired by the recent works of Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric 
Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018), and Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 
37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004). The behavior we label “bankruptcy hardball” does not necessarily 
involve a bankruptcy filing, and “bankruptcy hardball” should be thought of as describing a universe of 
aggressive tactics in debtor-creditor relations. Many of them are not new; what is new, we believe, is the 
frequency and intensity of the deployment of hardball tactics, partially as a result of legal changes we 
describe infra Part III.B.2–3. 
 11. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in 
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 923 (2003) (discussing corporate governance in bankruptcy); see 
also Michelle M. Harner et al., Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value Uncertainty, 22 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167 (2014) (discussing Chapter 11 proceedings for alternative funds). 
 12. See also Adam J. Levitin, The Problematic Case for Incentive Compensation in Bankruptcy, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 101 (2007) (noting that the biggest corporate governance problem in Chapter 11 
is navigating “the uncertainties of valuation and hence of the incentives and identity of the residual 
owner”). See generally Harner et al., supra note 11; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, 
Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 669 (1993) (discussing management of insolvent companies). 
2020] BANKRUPTCY HARDBALL 749 
While this moral hazard—which we call control opportunism13—is well 
established, what has changed over the past ten years is the level of 
aggressiveness now observed of otherwise conventional firms. 
This change may be attributed, at least in part, to the common law’s retreat 
from its historical role protecting creditors.14 For most of American history, 
judges played an important role in policing control opportunism with various 
common law doctrines providing creditors with remedies if managers went 
beyond the accepted boundaries of opportunistic behavior.15 These doctrines did 
not function to hold managers liable to creditors for any business decision that 
did not work out.16 But, by explicitly focusing managerial decision-making on 
the interests of creditors and by exposing such decision-making to some form—
albeit hazy—of potential liability, they likely deterred a kind of swashbuckling 
recklessness or intentional dereliction of the creditor’s bargain.17 
However, on the eve of the financial crisis, the Delaware courts suddenly 
changed course.18 In 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court’s Gheewalla decision 
limited the fiduciary duties that managers previously owed to creditors in times 
of financial distress.19 This shift had an ideological motivation, as influential 
critics argued that creditors did not need protection from judges and that 
fiduciary duties and other equitable remedies were unnecessary to deter control 
opportunism.20 After all, such commentators reasoned, the largest creditors—
generally banks and bond investors—are well situated to protect themselves.21 
To the extent these sophisticated creditors fear opportunism, they can contract 
ex ante to prevent it, and courts can simply enforce those contracts as it becomes 
necessary to do so.22 Further, some judges declared that any opportunistic 
behavior not identified ex ante and banned by “contractual agreements” are ably 
policed by other safety-valve equitable doctrines and laws, such as “fraud and 
 
 13. We believe this Article is the first to use the phrase “control opportunism” as a generic 
description of the perverse incentives that drive investors and managers to exploit their control over 
Chapter 11 debtors to extract private benefits, as further explained in Part I. But many of the agency 
problems and frictions on optimal governance discussed herein have been discussed in other work. See 
Levitin, supra note 12. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra notes 83–100 and accompanying text. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See infra notes 87–103 and accompanying text. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text. 
 20. See, e.g., Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6 (arguing that fiduciary duties for creditors are 
unnecessary); infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6; Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: 
Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 864–68 (2008) (arguing 
against fiduciary duty protections for sophisticated creditors). 
 22. See Prod. Res. Grp. v. NCT Grp. (Production Resources), 863 A.2d 772, 789 (Del. Ch. 
2004). 
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fraudulent conveyance law, implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, 
bankruptcy law, general commercial law, and other sources of creditor rights.”23 
In this Article, we argue that Gheewalla and its progeny relieved corporate 
decision-making of important guiding principles, and, in the vacuous space that 
now exists, remarkable instances of control opportunism are observable and 
increasingly common place.24 We believe that this is the consequence of a 
fundamental misunderstanding of creditors’ ability to protect themselves reliably 
and predictably with contracts and bankruptcy law.25 First, we argue that there is 
no perfect contractual solution for this kind of problem because, even where 
creditors can foresee control opportunism, clever lawyering and the evolving 
circumstances of financial distress can help managers disable or evade 
enforcement of even the most skillfully crafted contractual covenants.26 While 
the contractarian scholar might retort that creditors simply need to write better 
contracts, we argue that distress gives rise to a sort of cat-and-mouse game, 
where contract enforcement often hinges more on practical reality than judicial 
process, and well-advised debtors and creditors routinely arrive at outcomes 
inconsistent with ex ante contracts.27 Indeed, as the cases we describe below 
make clear, debtors can often exploit their circumstances to essentially re-write 
their covenants while the otherwise counteracting force—the threat of breach of 
contract litigation—has increasingly less potency as a firm’s distress deepens.28 
Second, we contend that bankruptcy law currently provides far less 
protection for creditors than presumed by commentators and Delaware 
precedent.29 In theory, when firms encounter severe financial trouble, they file 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the judge supervises a management team devoted 
to maximizing the firm’s value to provide creditors with the best possible 
recovery, consistent with contractual terms negotiated pre-bankruptcy.30 In 
practice, however, bankruptcy judges balance creditor interests against other 
policy goals, such as the need for the firm to finance itself post-petition, to 
 
 23. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) 
(declaring that creditors do not get fiduciary duties, but are rather “afforded protection through 
contractual agreements, fraud and fraudulent conveyance law, implied covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing, [and] bankruptcy law . . . ”). 
 24. See infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 105–173 and accompanying text; see also Haslund v. Simon Prop. Grp., 378 
F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (noting complete contracts are impossible, and contracts can 
be “shorter and simpler and cheaper” when courts fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in the case of 
litigation). 
 26. See infra notes 105–173 and accompanying text. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1369–78 (arguing bankruptcy provides 
sufficient protection for creditors, and, therefore, fiduciary duty shifting to creditors should be 
abolished). See contra infra notes 175–261 and accompanying text. 
 30. See generally John A. E. Pottow, Fiduciary Principles in Bankruptcy and Insolvency, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 205 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
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reorganize, and to protect the jobs of current and future employees.31 As further 
explained below, clever debtors and their lawyers understand this and have 
developed procedural strategies that effectively disable the formal machinery of 
creditor protection, including related doctrines like the law governing fraudulent 
transfers.32 This sort of bankruptcy hardball may help explain why PetSmart’s 
board decided to make such an opportunistic distribution of value: with funds 
already in hand, the firm’s private equity sponsor became better positioned to get 
more than it might be entitled to at the conclusion of a bankruptcy process or 
out-of-court restructuring.33 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we define the problem of control 
opportunism. In Part II, we describe the common law’s migration away from 
creditor protection, as well as the ideological underpinnings of that paradigm 
shift. In Part III, we discuss several case studies that illustrate the current state of 
affairs. While creditors were successful in thwarting opportunistic behavior in 
some of the cases we describe, we choose these cases because they illustrate 
different strategies that managers can use to play bankruptcy hardball, with great 
costs to creditors.34 
In Part IV, we argue that Delaware judges and bankruptcy judges could do 
a great deal to restore order to debtor-creditor relations by subjecting alleged 
control opportunism to greater scrutiny and by taking a more skeptical view of 
attempts by managers to disable ex ante contracts.35 Admittedly, Gheewalla is 
not the only force that has reshaped debtor-creditor relations. For example, 
perpetually favorable debt market conditions in the years after the financial crisis 
have reduced the bargaining power of debt investors and emboldened managers, 
and the rise of hedge funds and claims trading has changed the administration of 
Chapter 11.36 However, we assert that, ceteris paribus, the status quo could be 
improved if today’s standards were applied more rigorously.37 Judges have the 
 
 31. See, e.g., infra notes 175–224 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 220–261 and accompanying text. 
 33. See, e.g., In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 503 B.R. 348, 353 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), abrogated 
by In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (demonstrating the 
advantage of already having received money even if there is fraudulent transfer risk associated with the 
conveyance). 
 34. They also present cases involving at least some degree of arguable control opportunism. 
Many cases, we suspect, involve less readily observable opportunistic conduct. 
 35. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism 
(Harvard Pub. L., Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015) (arguing that equitable doctrines are needed to 
constrain opportunism). 
 36. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648 
(2010); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1686 (2009) 
(detailing many changes that have altered the bargaining dynamic in Chapter 11, such as the rise of 
claims trading, the influence of hedge funds, and investors holding credit default swaps). For a 
discussion of the continuing borrower-friendly credit markets, see Joe Rennison, In Leveraged Loans, 
Sellers Are Still in Near-Total Control, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/68a67be6-4b58-11e9-8b7f-d49067e0f50d/ [https://perma.cc/445E-ZW76]. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
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discretion to counteract opportunistic behavior if they choose to do so.38 Indeed, 
the credit markets need predictability more than anything else, and today’s 
frenzied world of dashed expectations and chaotic litigation is anything but 
predictable.39 To the extent that creditor expectations are not routinely upheld ex 
post, investors will adjust ex ante by avoiding certain deal structures—perhaps 
making efficient financings unreachable in some cases, limiting the supply of 
capital to businesses.40 
I. 
THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL OPPORTUNISM DURING TIMES OF FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS 
In this Section, we define what we believe is the major friction on optimal 
governance for distressed firms: control opportunism.41 After establishing this 
analytical framework, we explain how management will be tempted to use their 
control over the firm to extract benefits—either for itself or for its traditional 
fiduciary constituents, the shareholders—by favoring one group of investors 
over another. 
A. The Classic Twin Agency Problems of Corporate Law 
In a healthy corporation, the main agency problems of managers and 
shareholders are well understood and usually considered to be driven by different 
problematic incentives.42 First, managers are said to be tempted by moral hazard 
to use their control of a healthy firm to extract value that would otherwise go to 
shareholders, such as by abusing the compensation-setting process to extract 
undeserved money43 or by manipulating a sale process to make it easier for 
 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Clifford J. White III, Professional Fees, Corporate Governance, Predictability and 
Transparency in Chapter 11, 35 AM. BANKR. INS. J. 12 (2016) (discussing the importance of 
predictability in Chapter 11). 
 40. Investors often tailor investment contracts with an eye towards minimizing the firm’s cost 
of capital—which can involve allocating control and monitoring rights in a range of arrangements. If 
creditors cannot trust that their recovery expectations will be held up ex post, it may limit the contracting 
space that investors can use to customize these bargains, reducing the supply of capital on the margin 
and perhaps even reducing the aggregate amount of economic activity. 
 41. For a more expansive treatment of all of the ways creditors can be opportunistic, see 
Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1035, 1049–59 (2011). Lipson discusses what he calls “creditor opportunism,” a wider category that 
includes not only abuses of the power of control but also complexities created by creditors owning a 
wide range of claims against the firm. What we call “control opportunism” is a more limited species of 
opportunism because it is confined to the temptation creditors have to be opportunistic through obtaining 
control of the firm, but “control opportunism” is also more expansive because it focuses on the behavior 
of managers, not creditors. 
 42. For the seminal article on this topic, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 43. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (discussing executives’ control over 
their pay). 
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management’s preferred owner to buy the company instead of a higher paying 
bidder.44 
There is a second agency problem at the heart of corporate governance as 
well: the agency conflict between shareholders and creditors.45 Shareholders 
control a firm by electing the board of directors, which hires the senior officers 
who actually run the firm.46 Because managers owe shareholders a fiduciary 
duty, it is often assumed they are operating the firm on behalf of shareholders.47 
However, the typical firm also usually funds its activities with some amount of 
debt.48 This leads to an agency conflict when the firm approaches insolvency 
because managers may take excessive risks to pursue shareholders’ interests.49 
For example, a firm may launch a new product that will either succeed massively 
or exhaust the firm’s remaining assets.50 To the extent these risks turn out to 
produce strong returns, the returns mostly inure to the benefit of shareholders.51 
To the extent the risks are unsuccessful, the downside generally falls on creditors 
who can find themselves holding claims against a firm with diminished value.52 
Creditors recognize this problem and routinely contract to block managers from 
pursuing excessively risky actions. For example, creditors may require firms to 
keep a minimum level of money in the bank or insist on creditor approval for 
major investments that could divert significant amounts of value.53 
B. The Debt-Equity Conflict in Modern Finance: Control Opportunism 
and Incentive Conflicts between Holders of Options 
The debt-equity conflict becomes even more complicated when its 
theoretical intuitions are imposed on modern corporate finance. Large 
conglomerates do not fit the classic paradigm of one corporate borrower, a single 
creditor, and an individual shareholder.54 Instead, sizeable firms fund their 
 
 44. See, e.g., LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Yakov 
Amihud ed., 1989) (discussing the debate over management’s private interests in deciding the timing 
and purchaser of leveraged buyouts). 
 45. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor 
Interests: Applications of Agency Theory, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE (E. I. Altman 
& M. G. Subrahmanyam eds., 1985). 
 46. For a discussion of the history of independent directors, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
 47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019). 
 48. See, e.g., Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, Capital Structure and Debt Structure, 23 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 4242 (2010). 
 49. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of 
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 118. 
 53. See id. at 125–46 (describing bond covenants). 
 54. See Rauh & Sufi, supra note 48, at 4243. 
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activities with a combination of secured debt, unsecured debt, and equity.55 The 
investors who provide all three forms of capital are contracting to receive 
different levels of return with different levels of risk.56 It is clearest to think of 
modern investors as holding options with different levels of priority against the 
firm’s assets.57 
Consider a hypothetical firm owned by a private equity sponsor that owes 
$100 to secured creditors and $50 to unsecured bondholders. In insolvency, all 
of these investors will be the equivalent of the holders of options.58 The firm’s 
secured lenders have what they probably think of ex ante as a deeply-in-the-
money, capped call option to receive a repayment of principal plus an interest 
payment, as well as the right to receive the first $100 in firm value in insolvency. 
The firm’s unsecured bondholders have the equivalent of a capped option to 
receive the next $50 in value from $100 until $150. The private equity sponsor 
has an option to receive all of the value of the firm after the $150 in debt has 
been paid in full.59 
Accordingly, for the modern firm, the debt-equity conflict is driven by the 
firm’s financial circumstances and solvency at any given point in time. Imagine 
our hypothetical firm is considering a business plan that has a 50 percent chance 
of yielding a total firm value of $200 if it succeeds, and a 50 percent chance of 
destroying most of the firm’s value and leaving only $10 for distribution to 
creditors if it fails. If the firm is worth $100 today, secured creditors stand in the 
same position as “creditors” in the classic debt-equity narrative in that they will 
suffer the downside of the plan’s failure, going from a 100 percent payoff to a 
10 percent payoff. And while the private equity shareholder remains the ultimate 
beneficiary of the plan’s success, the first $50 inures to the benefit of unsecured 
creditors. As a result, the classic debt-equity conflict is better understood as a 
conflict between the holders of “deeply-in-the-money” options versus “out-of-
 
 55. See id. 
 56. See, e.g., C. Edward Dobbs, Negotiating Points in Second Lien Financing Transactions, 
4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 189 (2006) (discussing the interest of lenders in funding riskier, junior lien 
loans in exchange for higher returns). 
 57. See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 611–46 (3d ed. 2012). 
 58. See, e.g., id. The option-pricing framework is useful here because it provides a single 
framework for thinking about how pre-bankruptcy investors are treated in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, 
state law and contract characteristics like security and subordination create a hierarchy between creditors 
who have a right to receive a pay out if their claim is “in the money.” Investors are “in the money” if the 
firm is worth enough that the investors, with their spot in line, can expect to receive a payout. For 
example, if a firm is worth $500 as of the Chapter 11 petition date, a senior creditor who is entitled to 
the first $50 in firm value has a “deeply-in-the-money” option, meaning the firm’s value would have to 
go down by $450—our measure of depth—for that senior creditor to sustain losses. If the firm is instead 
worth $100, the senior creditor would still be “in the money,” but not as deeply in the money as before. 
A similar senior creditor owed $50 by a firm worth only $50 has an “at-the-money” call option, where 
the expected payout will be reduced dollar-for-dollar if the firm’s value falls. 
 59. See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 654 (1973). 
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the-money” options, where the identity of the option holders will vary based on 
the underlying facts.60 One cannot identify the incentives of a particular investor 
simply by looking at the type of investment contract they used—secured loan 
versus unsecured loan, for example—without contextualizing the priority 
created by those contracts within the capital structure as a whole and the firm’s 
value. 
When a firm is insolvent, management will enjoy two forms of control over 
the ultimate payoff the firm’s investors receive. The first is over the substance 
of any restructuring. This can involve, for example, migrating value within a 
conglomerate or away from the firm altogether through distributions to 
shareholders.61 These types of transactions are about manipulating how and how 
much particular stakeholders recover vis-à-vis competitors in the capital 
structure.62 There are less overt instances of substantive control including 
managerial decisions about a firm’s new business plan, how much value 
generally exists for distribution to creditors, and what the reorganized firm’s 
capital structure should look like.63 An aggressive business plan with optimistic 
projections of future earnings can support a higher valuation and more debt than 
a pragmatic plan with more conservative assumptions.64 The higher the 
valuation, the more value that management or a bankruptcy judge can deem 
exists for distribution to creditors or shareholders.65 
 
 60. This is not a new way of viewing the debt-equity conflict. Chancellor Allen reflected on a 
similar hypothetical in the famous footnote 55 of Credit Lyonnais. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 
N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
The key intuition in this framework is to recognize the traditional model of debt-equity agency conflict—
shareholders want risk, creditors want to liquidate today—is incomplete when mapped onto the 
complexity of modern finance. For example, unsecured creditors of one firm may have a bias towards 
liquidation because they are deeply in the money, while unsecured creditors of another firm may have a 
bias towards taking risks because they are out of the money. One cannot understand the bias of an 
individual investor simply by looking at the type of investment contract they have; one must look at the 
broader context of the value of the firm to recognize how those incentives might impact their behavior. 
 61. For example, the debtor can move value outside of a collateral basket under a secured loan 
agreement or from one corporate entity to another. 
 62. An example of this kind of substantive control is the PetSmart fact pattern discussed above, 
where the board authorized a large dividend to shareholders and otherwise migrated value within the 
conglomerate away from creditors before restructuring discussions even began. See supra notes 2–5 and 
accompanying text. 
 63. See Jared A. Ellias, Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 
11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 493, 494–96 (2016). 
 64. See id. 
 65. At the end of the bankruptcy case, the judge must apportion the value of the firm based on 
pre-bankruptcy entitlements to value. As it is impossible to achieve a scientific measurement of the value 
of an operating business, the typical practice in bankruptcy is to estimate the firm’s value via expert 
evidence or an auction process for all of the firm’s assets. When the firm’s value is estimated with expert 
evidence, an investment banker will typically draw on management’s business plan to come up with an 
estimated range of firm value, and the judge will determine whether a plan proponent, relying on such 
expert evidence, has carried its burden of proof. See id. 
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Second, management controls the timing of any decision to restructure its 
debt by modifying its debt contracts and reorganizing its capital structure.66 This 
can mean a consensual out-of-court exchange or a bankruptcy filing.67 These 
decisions can also be enormously consequential for investors.68 A quick 
bankruptcy filing can benefit senior option holders, who may prefer to exchange 
their debt for the firm’s equity today rather than risk further degradation of firm 
value.69 A slow trip through bankruptcy can extend the option of out-of-the-
money creditors or shareholders, and give the firm’s operations time to 
improve.70 
In exercising this discretion, management will be tempted by what we refer 
to as control opportunism: corporate decision-making that favors one group of 
stakeholders over another and can benefit management financially or in other 
ways.71 For example, imagine that there are plausible reasons to think that a 
troubled firm should delay bankruptcy because its fortunes will improve, and 
also imagine that, at the same time, there are equally plausible reasons to think a 
firm should immediately file for bankruptcy because its fortunes will not 
improve. Neither option is a clear value-maximizing strategy, so the board looks 
for reasons other than value maximization to select one strategy over the other. 
Management can align with the senior option holder and file for bankruptcy 
immediately with a conservative business plan and strategy to exit bankruptcy 
quickly. In exchange, the senior option holder can reward managers with 
lucrative post-bankruptcy employment.72 Alternatively, management can align 
with junior option holders and delay filing for bankruptcy as long as possible, or 
file for bankruptcy with an aggressive business plan that keeps junior option 
holders in the money. Management may choose this path for several different 
reasons. One is because they traditionally think of themselves as working for the 
shareholders who appointed them. Another possibility is that management holds 
 
 66. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 221–33 
(2004). 
 67. See generally William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1597 (2018) (discussing out-of-court debt exchanges exchanges). 
 68. See generally LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 12, at 691–719. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Here too, Chancellor Allen’s footnote 55 is reflective of what is observed in the real world. 
See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at 
*34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, 
exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors.”); see also 
Ellias, supra note 63 (describing the moral hazards and perverse incentives managers face). 
 72. See, e.g., Jared A. Ellias, Regulating Bankruptcy Bonuses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 653, 682 
(2019) (discussing the post-bankruptcy employment contract awarded by senior option holders to 
Citadel Broadcasting’s CEO). 
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a potentially lucrative block of the firm’s stock. Lastly, management may simply 
have little affinity for the firm’s lenders.73 
Moreover, even a manager free of any bias towards any stakeholder has 
private incentives to run a bankruptcy process geared towards a quick exit and 
lower creditor recoveries. For example, managers generally want to avoid the 
scrutiny and expense associated with bankruptcy.74 If bankruptcy is unavoidable, 
then they naturally want the company to exit as soon as possible to minimize the 
delay, inconvenience, and business dislocation that comes with running a firm 
under bankruptcy court administration.75 Managers also generally prefer to have 
as little debt as possible upon emergence from bankruptcy in order to free up 
future financing capacity and make a return trip to bankruptcy less likely.76 
Further, management is unlikely to benefit from a prolonged bankruptcy process 
that exhausts restructuring options and fairly adjudicates all creditor claims. 
Importantly, control opportunism can have significant real-world 
consequences. Fear that managers will favor one creditor group over another can 
upset incentives to invest ex ante.77 Further, the incentives managers have to be 
strategic and run a speedy bankruptcy process lead many observers to conclude 
Chapter 11 practice currently favors senior option holders at the expense of 
junior creditors and shareholders, even without any attempt by management to 
favor one group over another.78 
II. 
THE MODERN APPROACH OF THE COMMON LAW TO CONTROL OPPORTUNISM 
While modern finance has complicated the story of control opportunism, 
the law has long recognized that managers have distorted incentives when a firm 
nears insolvency. Historically, courts extended equitable protections that created 
liability for managers who grossly abused their discretion. In early American 
history, this equitable protection took the form of the so-called “trust fund 
doctrine.” In modern times, judges used fiduciary duty law to protect creditors.79 
 
 73. Social psychology has long recognized that people tend to be biased in favor of other people 
and things they are more familiar with. See, e.g., Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 
9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1968) (showing evidence of the mere exposure effect). 
 74. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment 
Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991) (suggesting that managers prioritize avoiding financial trouble, 
especially bankruptcy). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor 
Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 191 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 266–67 (2005). 
 77. See generally Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 
209 (2012). 
 78. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
673 (2003); George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19 (2004); Stephen 
J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839 (2005); see also Skeel, supra note 
11, at 923. 
 79. As this Article focuses on developments since the financial crisis, space constraints prevent 
us from fully discussing the trust fund doctrine. For good introductions, see Hu & Westbrook, supra 
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In this Section, we briefly summarize the rise and fall of modern fiduciary duties 
to creditors. 
A. The Emergence of Fiduciary Duties for Creditors in Delaware 
In the early 1980s, corporate debt became more central to corporate finance, 
as banking deregulation and the rise of junk bonds changed the traditional profile 
of a typical corporate creditor. Thus, the classic agency problem between debt 
and equity began to loom larger and larger. The problem of debt grew in 
importance as junk bonds opened up a new source of junior priority financing, 
and firms began to finance riskier ventures with debt that might have previously 
been funded with equity.80 Junk bonds also financed a wave of leveraged 
buyouts. Debt as a percentage of firm value increased from about 25 percent of 
firm value in the 1930s to 65 percent in the early 1990s.81 Eventually, corporate 
America began to labor under this unprecedented debt load. 
Perhaps in reaction to the rise of debt as well as the need to adjudicate 
claims arising out of leveraged buyouts, the Delaware Chancery Court expanded 
the range of scenarios in which boards of directors would need to consider 
creditor interests.82 In Credit Lyonnais, the court held that the board of a firm 
“operating in the vicinity of insolvency” owed its fiduciary duty not just to 
shareholders but also to the “corporate enterprise” as a whole.83 This shift was 
 
note 6, at 1331–36, and Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation’s Board of Directors Owe a 
Fiduciary Duty to its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 589 (1994). Justice Story’s “trust fund doctrine” 
also aligned with seminal receivership and bankruptcy precedent, including Supreme Court opinions: 
(i) establishing the absolute priority rule, see N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502 (1913); (ii) 
imposing strict evidentiary standards before creditors must cede value to shareholders, see Nat’l Sur. 
Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426, 436–37 (1933); and (iii) condemning control opportunism intended to shift 
estate value from creditors to shareholders, see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311–13 (1939). Many of 
these principles were incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code, see for example 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) 
(2018), and continue to shape lender expectations. But, as discussed herein, these principles are 
increasingly ignored and/or rendered ineffectual in the day-to-day administration of insolvency 
scenarios and bankruptcy cases. 
 80. See Jeremy I. Bulow et al., Distinguishing Debt from Equity in the Junk Bond Era, in DEBT, 
TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 135, 144–45 (John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990). 
 81. See John R. Graham et al., A Century of Capital Structure: The Leveraging of Corporate 
America, 118 J. FIN. ECON. 658, 659 (2015) (tracing the history of corporate debt). 
 82. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); see also Dianne F. Coffino & Charles H. Jeanfreau, Delaware 
Hits the Brakes: The Effect of Gheewalla and Trenwick on Creditor Claims, 17 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 1 
(2008) (describing the shift). Even prior to Credit Lyonnais, many courts outside of Delaware held that 
the fiduciary duties of directors shifted from the corporation’s stockholders to its creditors when the 
corporation was in fact insolvent. See, e.g., Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); 
see also FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1982) (“However, when the corporation 
becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors.”). 
Note that, even before Credit Lyonnais and Gheewalla, some Delaware courts had already begun to 
articulate a view that deprived creditors of equitable protections. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 
873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“The terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts 
such as fairness define the corporation’s obligation to its bondholders.”). 
 83. 1991 WL 277613, at *34. Twenty-five years before Credit Lyonnais, in 1974, a Delaware 
court suggested in dicta that a creditor might be able to recover against directors or officers of a 
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necessary given directors’ incentives to put creditors’ money at risk while 
looking out for shareholder interests.84 The Credit Lyonnais opinion, while 
unpublished, was widely influential in changing the liability calculus of boards 
of directors. After Credit Lyonnais, if the firm was “in the vicinity of 
insolvency,” directors could be held liable to creditors as well as shareholders.85 
B. Academic Critique of Equitable Protections and Judicial Movement 
Away from Fiduciary Duties for Creditors 
The law’s evolution toward protecting creditors was not well-received by 
many academic commentators and Delaware jurists. Academics disputed the 
fundamental logic of Credit Lyonnais.86 Courts thought they were reducing the 
costs of contracting by not requiring creditors to anticipate all scenarios where 
creditor interests could diverge from shareholders. Academic contract theorists, 
in particular, became increasingly convinced that equitable doctrines aimed to 
achieve fairness—like those voiding otherwise enforceable contracts—were 
largely unnecessary and that courts should enforce agreements strictly as 
written.87 As Douglas Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen wrote in an influential 
article in 2006, after first describing the ability of lenders to create and enforce 
contractual covenants: 
In today’s environment, we see little need for judicial doctrines designed 
to promote investor welfare. For example, courts in recent years have 
taken more seriously the notion that the board’s allegiance should shift 
to the creditors when the business finds itself in the “zone of 
insolvency.” In the absence of such a shift of priorities, the argument 
goes, the board may incline too much toward imprudent gambles 
 
corporation even without a contractual right in the event of “fraud, insolvency, or a violation of a 
statute . . . .” Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 347 
A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). 
 84. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34; see also Myron M. Sheinfeld & Judy Harris 
Pippitt, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a Corporation in the Vicinity of Insolvency and After Initiation 
of a Bankruptcy Case, 60 BUS. LAW. 79, 88 (2004). 
 85. See, e.g., Bo Becker & Per Strömberg, Fiduciary Duties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts, 
25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1931, 1933, 1937 (2012) (noting that Credit Lyonnais was “immediately recognized 
as an important precedent” and finding empirical evidence that firms altered their capital structure and 
investment policy in light of the new legal regime). 
 86. See, e.g., Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1348 (“[D]uty shifting doctrines are flatly 
inconsistent with the long-held aspirations of the field of corporate governance and they preclude the 
use of analytical techniques made possible by modern finance.”); see also Frederick Tung, Gap Filling 
in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1201, 1204 (2007) (“[A]t least for commercial creditors, 
fiduciary duties that include such creditors are unnecessary . . . .”). 
 87. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the 
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1193 (2003) (arguing that the ability of 
banks and bondholders to protect themselves and exit bad investments mean that they should be limited 
to the contractual rights they have negotiated); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and 
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 618 (2003) (arguing that commercial parties “want the 
state to enforce the contracts that they write, not the contracts that a decisionmaker with a concern for 
fairness would prefer them to have written”). 
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designed to get them back into the money. Such a shift of fiduciary 
duties may be unnecessary, however. Lenders, as we have seen, are 
quite capable of taking care of themselves. Rather than adding ill- 
defined fiduciary duties to the contracts that they write, a better course 
may be to ensure that such duties do not impede the exercise of 
contractual rights for which creditors have bargained.88 
As academic commentators increasingly argued against fiduciary duty 
shifting on theoretical grounds, Delaware courts grew less confident that the 
system they created in Credit Lyonnais was administrable or logically coherent.89 
Thus, in Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court essentially reversed Credit 
Lyonnais and eliminated the idea that fiduciary duties shift in the “zone of 
insolvency.”90 The court noted that creditors have many ways to protect 
themselves, such as contractual covenants, fraudulent transfer law, and the 
implied covenant of good faith. The court concluded that these protections 
“render the imposition of an additional, unique layer of protection through direct 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty unnecessary.”91 Gheewalla merely left open 
the possibility that creditors could bring derivative claims against the board when 
the firm became insolvent.92 
In Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, the Delaware Chancery 
Court went even further, arguably placing creditors in a worse position in 
fiduciary duty analysis than prior to Credit Lyonnais.93 In Quadrant, the court 
found that the directors and officers of insolvent firms do not owe a fiduciary 
duty to creditors.94 Instead, the directors of an insolvent firm may consider the 
interests of creditors when assessing their fiduciary duty to the corporation, 
 
 88. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1248 (2006); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much 
Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335 
(2007) (arguing that firms in the zone of insolvency owe creditors only those rights contracted for and 
those implied by the covenant of good faith). 
 89. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, 906 A.2d 168, 170–74 (Del. Ch. 2006) 
(echoing the reasoning of the Chancery Court that deepening insolvency was only a “catchy term” and 
not a legitimate cause of action); see also Hugh M. McDonald et al., Lafferty’s Orphan: The 
Abandonment of Deepening Insolvency, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 56, 56 (2007) (“[D]eepening 
insolvency—whether articulated as a cause of action or theory of damages—is based on a brittle legal 
foundation that is quickly eroding away.”). 
 90. See Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“In 
Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court discarded the zone [of insolvency].”); see also Adam B. 
Badawi, Debt Contract Terms and Creditor Control, 4 J. L. FIN. ACC. 1 (2019) (examining the impact 
of the Gheewalla decision); Charles H. Jeanfreau, Unexpected Setbacks for Creditors in Chapter 11 
Cases, 2012 ANN. SURVS. BANKR. L. 365, 369 (2012) (“After Gheewalla, the ability of creditors of 
solvent corporations to use the threat of a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit against directors to increase 
their leverage in restructuring negotiations was sharply curtailed.”). 
 91. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 100 (Del. 2007). 
 92. See generally Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 82. 
 93. See 102 A.3d at 174 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 94. See id. at 176 (citing Robert J. Stearn, Jr. & Cory D. Kandestin, Delaware’s Solvency Test: 
What Is It and Does It Make Sense? A Comparison of Solvency Tests Under the Bankruptcy Code and 
Delaware Law, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 165, 171 (2011)). 
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which in some cases might justify taking a “less risky” course of action such as 
an efficient liquidation.95 But, if the directors, in their business judgment, decide 
to take “extreme risk,” that decision too will be protected by the business 
judgment rule.96 
In sum, Quadrant confirmed that Gheewalla marked a radical shift in the 
law. Prior to Gheewalla, it was largely uncontested that directors needed to focus 
their efforts on creditor returns during times of insolvency, or face liability.97 
After Gheewalla, that is no longer the case. While creditors may still bring 
derivative claims in limited scenarios such as disloyal wealth transfers,98 this 
remaining right represents scant consolation for the loss of the broader 
protections previously enjoyed under traditional equity jurisprudence.99 
Juxtaposing the advice lawyers gave to distressed debtors before and after 
Gheewalla and Quadrant provides important evidence of the paradigm shift in 
the approach boards are counseled to take when a firm approaches insolvency. 
For example, in an article written for clients in 2001, lawyers at a leading law 
firm wrote that “[w]hen a corporation becomes insolvent, . . . [r]ather than 
pursuing high-risk strategies for the benefit of shareholders, directors must seek 
to protect creditors’ claims to corporate assets and earnings.”100 After Quadrant, 
a leading law firm wrote in a client alert that directors can now favor some 
 
 95. See id. at 175 (citing Production Resources, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004), as standing for 
the proposition that the “zone of insolvency” line of cases should be understood as providing directors 
a defense if they choose a more conservative course of action instead of “undertak[ing] extreme risk”). 
In the language of financial economics, an efficient liquidation is a liquidation where the assets are 
efficiently put to their highest-valued use, typically through sale to its highest valued user. For example, 
a failed retailer might efficiently liquidate its land to a housing developer that builds apartment buildings. 
For a deeper discussion of how bankruptcy law reallocates assets toward productive uses, see Shai 
Bernstein et al., Asset Allocation in Bankruptcy, 74 J. FIN. 5 (2019). 
 96. See Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 192 (Del. Ch. 2014) (stating 
that the creditor plaintiff cannot rebut the business judgment rule merely by arguing that the directors 
took an excessively risky course of action, so long as it was designed to benefit the corporation as a 
whole, including creditors). 
 97. As Sabin Willett notes, the change created by Gheewalla was so significant that it likely 
took lawyers a period of adjustment before they began to advise boards that fiduciary duties no longer 
ran to creditors. See Sabin Willet, Gheewalla and the Director’s Dilemma, 64 BUS. LAW. 1087, 1088 
(2009). 
 98. See Quadrant Structured Prod. Liability Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.2d 535, 544 (Del. Ch. 2015) 
(noting that the chief function of the creditor derivative suit is to protect a corporation from self-dealing 
payments and other disloyal wealth transfers). 
 99. See Prod. Res. Grp. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772, 798 (Del. Ch. 2004) (suggesting that such 
a scenario could be a situation in which “directors display such a marked degree of animus towards a 
particular creditor with a proven entitlement to payment that they expose themselves to a direct fiduciary 
duty claim by that creditor”); see also Bryan Anderson, Gheewalla and Insolvency: Greater Certainty 
for Directors of Distressed Companies, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1031, 1037 (2009) (explaining that dicta in 
Production Resources and Big Lots left open the possibility of direct claims by creditors). 
 100. J. Douglas Bacon & Jennifer A. Love, When Good Things Happen to Bad People: Practical 
Aspects of Holding Directors and Managers of Insolvent Corporations Accountable, 10 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 185, 186 (2001). 
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creditors over others without having to worry about liability.101 Another leading 
law firm wrote that Quadrant protects directors “adopting a high-risk business 
strategy that might benefit controlling shareholders when a corporation is 
insolvent . . . .”102 
In other words, pre-Gheewalla, the advice was stern, directional, and 
protective of the creditors’ bargain. Post-Quadrant, the advice is vacuous and 
provides little directional guidance to the board. Advice focuses instead on the 
freedom from liability the board now enjoys so long as the board can plausibly 
justify its actions. 
III. 
GHEEWALLA’S SHAKY FOUNDATIONS 
Without fiduciary duty, creditor protection rests on the idea that creditors 
are sufficiently protected through contract law, with fraudulent transfer law and 
bankruptcy law hovering in the background. We consider each of these 
arguments in turn, using case studies to suggest that each area of law provides 
far less protection for creditors than the Delaware courts assumed. 
A. The Limits of Contractual Solutions to Control Opportunism 
The classic argument against equitable protections for creditors is that 
creditors can protect themselves with contract law.103 The problem with this 
argument is that creditors cannot design perfect contractual language ex ante to 
cover all conceivable forms of opportunism. In this Section, we use three case 
studies to show how management can play bankruptcy hardball to thwart 
contractual expectations or impose costs that creditors could not have prevented 
ex ante. In our first case study, Forest Oil, we show how managers can design 
transactions to exploit contractual ambiguities. The lesson of this case study is 
that even creditors who anticipate opportunism can struggle to craft a covenant 
that good lawyers cannot evade ex post. In our second case study, Cumulus 
 
 101. See John L. Reed, Delaware Court of Chancery Issues Significant Ruling on the Ability of 
Creditors to Assert Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Directors: Key Takeaways, DLA PIPER LLP (May 
14, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/05/delaware-court--chancery-
issues-significant-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/7KN2-MN33] (noting that after Gheewalla, directors can 
favor certain creditors over others without breaching their fiduciary duty and have no obligation to run 
the business for the protection of creditors); see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, MORE CLARITY 
FOR DELAWARE DIRECTORS WHEN CONSIDERING RESTRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS (2015), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Restructuring.pdf/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y9PR-D6S6] (noting that directors are now protected by the business judgment rule 
even in insolvency); Marshall S. Huebner & Darren S. Klein, The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of 
Troubled Companies, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (2015). 
 102. Mark S. Chehi et al., Delaware Court of Chancery Decision Clarifies Fiduciary Issues in 
Insolvent Company Context, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (2015), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2015/01/delaware-court-of-chancery-decision-
clarifies-fidu/ [https://perma.cc/LK5Q-4HW5]. 
 103. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text. 
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Media, we show that managers can reinterpret contractual language for uses and 
transactions that were probably never anticipated by the lenders that originally 
extended credit. In the third case study, Colt Holdings, we show how control of 
a corporation can give managers the opportunity to stall a bankruptcy filing and, 
after filing for bankruptcy, to stall an inevitable restructuring, destroying 
millions of dollars in value to prolong the private equity owner’s option value. 
This problem is very hard to solve with a contract. 
The important lesson of this Section is that, even when creditors expressly 
recognize a risk, designing a contractual solution is hard—and may, in fact, be 
impossible given the skill of the lawyers that represent insolvent companies and 
that the threat of contract-based litigation has decreasing potency as the 
company’s fortunes deteriorate. 
1. Forest Oil: Thwarting the Intent of a Contract with Form-Over-
Substance Transaction Engineering 
For an example of how control opportunism can thwart creditors’ 
bargained-for protections, consider Forest Oil Corporation (Forest Oil). In early 
2014, Forest Oil was a deeply troubled company.104 The oil and natural gas firm 
was buffeted by declining revenue and overwhelming debt, which included 
borrowings under a reserve-based loan facility and about $800 million in 
unsecured bonds.105 In May of 2014, Forest Oil entered a deal that promised to 
solve its financial trouble: a sale of the firm to Sabine Oil & Gas Company 
(Sabine).106 Under the terms of the deal, the combined entity would repay all 
outstanding debt, and Forest Oil’s public stockholders would receive a healthy 
equity interest in the new enterprise.107 The transaction was scheduled to close 
towards the end of 2014.108 
Importantly, Forest Oil’s bondholders had protected themselves with a 
“change-of-control” covenant in case the firm was sold or underwent a similar 
fundamental transformation.109 The bond indentures defined “change-of-
control” broadly to include several possibilities, including: (1) when a person or 
group comes to own more than 50 percent of the total voting power of the 
company; (2) upon the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the company; 
and (3) upon a merger or consolidation with another entity resulting in Forest Oil 
stockholders no longer holding at least 50 percent voting power.110 The “change-
of-control” covenant thus required the bond debt to be paid off in full if someone 
 
 104. See Declaration of Michael Magilton at 7, In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 503 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 15-11835). 
 105. See id. at 19–20, 50–52. 
 106. Id. at 13. 
 107. See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 521. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Complaint ¶¶ 24–57, Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Forest Oil Corp., No. 650584/2015 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Wilmington Savings Complaint]. 
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bought Forest Oil.111 Accordingly, Sabine arranged for the combined firm to 
borrow $800 million in new bank debt to refinance the outstanding bonds.112 
However, prior to the closing of the transaction between Forest Oil and 
Sabine, crude oil prices collapsed and threw the assumptions undergirding the 
deal into chaos.113 Sabine found itself with a deal it no longer wanted on the 
terms it had negotiated.114 While Sabine had the financial wherewithal to close 
the deal, the fall in oil prices meant that the combined company would struggle 
to service the debt that the deal would require.115 Sabine wanted out.116 The 
Forest Oil board initially refused, and for good reason: Forest Oil would not 
survive on its own, and falling commodity prices were a contractual risk assumed 
by Sabine and its private equity sponsor.117 Indeed, by this point, Forest Oil was 
clearly insolvent, with assets estimated to cover approximately 70 percent of its 
bond debt.118 To avoid bankruptcy, Forest Oil needed the deal to somehow 
close—but on terms Sabine could accept.119 
To bridge the gap with Sabine, a Forest Oil director suggested an alternative 
approach.120 The merger would close as originally planned, but the Forest Oil 
bonds would not be refinanced.121 Rather, the bonds would remain outstanding 
post-closing, but subordinated to $1.65 billion in preexisting Sabine secured debt 
that would be merged into the combined company.122 To achieve this outcome, 
the transaction was re-engineered to avoid triggering a “change-of-control” 
under the Forest Oil bond indentures.123 The work-around was simple: instead of 
buying all of Forest Oil’s stock, Sabine’s equity sponsor would receive stock 
with limited control rights.124 
The re-engineered transaction circumvented the intent of the “change-of-
control” covenant. More specifically, the revised transaction would allow Forest 
Oil stockholders to retain majority voting power in the company, but it would 
 
 111. See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 521. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Crude oil fell from $103 per barrel in July to $55 per barrel by mid-December of 2014. 
Complaint ¶¶ 51–53, In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 503 (2016) (No. 15-11835) [hereinafter 
Sabine Oil Complaint]. 
 114. See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 525. 
 115. See Debtors’ Objection to the Motions of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 
Forest Notes Indenture Trustees, and Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company N.A. for (I) Leave, 
Standing, and Authority to Commence and Prosecute Certain Claims and Causes of Action on Behalf 
of the Debtors’ Estates And (II) Non-Exclusive Settlement Authority at 4, In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 
547 B.R. 503 (2016) (No. 15-11835) [hereinafter Sabine Oil Debtors’ Objection]. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See Sabine Oil Complaint, supra note 113, ¶¶ 75–81. 
 118. See id. ¶¶ 120–22. 
 119. See id. ¶¶ 81. 
 120. See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 526. 
 121. See id. at 525–27. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 525. 
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leave them with only a 26.5 percent economic interest.125 First, a Certificate of 
Amendment authorized Forest Oil to increase the number of its common shares 
and to create new “Series A Non-Voting Equity-Equivalent Preferred Shares.”126 
Sabine then contributed its equity interests in Sabine Oil & Gas Holdings LLC 
to Forest Oil.127 In exchange for those equity contributions, Forest Oil granted 
Sabine shares of Forest Oil stock, representing, in all, approximately a 73.5 
percent economic interest in the new company and 40 percent of the total voting 
power.128 Because Forest Oil stockholders still retained a 60 percent majority of 
the voting stock of the company, a “change-of-control” did not occur as dictated 
by the bond indenture.129 
By any practical measure, however, a “change-of-control” certainly had 
occurred. The Forest Oil and Sabine boards approved “technical changes” to the 
post-closing corporate charter and bylaws. These changes gave Sabine’s private 
equity owner virtual control of the new board of directors that was guaranteed 
far into the future.130  
The Forest Oil and Sabine boards reached a solution—but one that came at 
the expense of bondholders. The modified transaction closed mid-December 
2014, without any advance notice to stakeholders.131 The bond market gasped at 
the betrayal, and the market value of outstanding Forest Oil bonds dropped from 
more than $800 million when the merger was announced to less than $370 
million. Bondholders found themselves suddenly sitting behind more than $1.6 
billion in legacy Sabine secured debt in the combined corporate structure.132 The 
Forest Oil bondholders promptly brought suit.133 Unfortunately, the lawsuit did 
not go far. A few months after the deal closed, the combined company filed for 
Chapter 11 relief.134 The bondholders’ lawsuit was stayed by the Chapter 11 
filing before the state court could even consider a motion to dismiss. In the end, 
Forest Oil bondholders recovered less than $16 million, or about 97 percent less 
than they could have received had their bargained-for covenants been honored. 
2. Cumulus Media: Thwarting the Intent of a Contract with an 
Implausible Debt Exchange 
For another example of a debtor devising a restructuring transaction that 
simultaneously satisfies the technical language of a debt contract while standing 
 
 125. See id. 
 126. Sabine Oil Complaint, supra note 113, ¶ 97. 
 127. See id. ¶ 98. 
 128. Declaration of Michael Magilton, supra note 104, at 62. 
 129. See In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. at 526. 
 130. See Wilmington Savings Complaint, supra note 110, at 44–46. 
 131. See id. at 41. 
 132. See Christine Idzelis & Laura J. Keller, Forest Oil Seen Punishing Bondholders with Rarely 
Used Loophole, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-
17/forest-oil-seen-punishing-bondholders-with-rarely-used-loophole/ [https://perma.cc/KW82-LQG5]. 
 133. See Declaration of Michael Magilton, supra note 104, at 26. 
 134. See id. at 1–2. 
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the spirit of the language on its head, consider Cumulus Media Inc. (Cumulus), 
one of the country’s largest owners of radio stations.135 Prior to financial distress, 
Cumulus borrowed $2.4 billion, consisting of a $1.8 billion senior secured term 
loan and $610 million in unsecured notes.136 By 2015, Cumulus began struggling 
and started exploring options to restructure its balance sheet.137 By the end of 
2016, the implied market value of Cumulus was below the amount of the secured 
debt, suggesting that the unsecured noteholders were completely “out of the 
money.”138 
Cumulus’ term loan credit agreement included standard terms that allowed 
the company to borrow additional secured debt under a “working capital” 
revolving line of credit. In general, a revolving line of credit is the corporate 
equivalent of a personal credit card. A revolving line of credit allows a company 
to borrow money and then repay it later. Most firms use revolving lines of credit 
to pay their daily operational needs, including raw material costs, payroll, rent, 
and utilities. Importantly, the revolving line of credit would be senior in payment 
priority to Cumulus’ term loan. While it may seem strange for term lenders to 
allow other lenders to have a senior claim, doing so actually protects the term 
lenders by providing the company the means to manage its business.139 
Revolving loans are generally a safe form of lending for banks, with low interest 
payments and a low likelihood of not being repaid in full if the firm falls into 
financial distress. 
As is increasingly common among distressed firms, Cumulus reacted to its 
financial distress by devising an aggressive strategy to “refinance” its debt. In 
reality, there was no refinancing: Cumulus planned to transform its bondholders 
into revolving lenders through a sham transaction that created a dubious 
revolving line of credit. The plan proceeded in three steps. First, Cumulus would 
 
 135. See Declaration of John F. Abbot in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions 
at 3, In re Cumulus Media Inc., No. 17-13381 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Declaration 
of John F. Abbot]. 
 136. The term loan was secured by a first priority lien on substantially all of Cumulus’ assets. See 
Cumulus Complaint Seeking Declaratory Judgment at 2, Cumulus Media Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, No. 16-cv-9591 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2017), 2017 WL 1367233 [hereinafter Cumulus 
Complaint]. 
 137. See Declaration of John F. Abbot, supra note 135, at 18–19 (noting that Cumulus made 
several large acquisitions, including Citadel Broadcasting in 2011 and then Westwood One in 2013). 
 138. Cumulus’ market value was only about $1.45 billion or, in other words, about $360 million 
less than the amount due to the secured lenders, rendering the unsecured noteholders completely out of 
the money. See Term Loan Parties’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–6, Cumulus Media 
Holdings Inc., No. 16-cv-9591, 2017 WL 1367233 [hereinafter Cumulus Term Loan Parties’ Memo] 
(reporting that between the third quarter of 2013, when the Term Loans were made, and the third quarter 
of 2016, Cumulus’ earnings fell by nearly 50 percent, from $416 million annually to $212 million). 
 139. The credit agreement allowed Cumulus to borrow in this way up to $200 million on a senior 
basis, but that amount could be increased with “incremental” facilities at the discretion of the borrower. 
By early 2017, Cumulus seemingly had the ability to borrow up to an additional $305 million ahead of 
the term lenders. See Cumulus Term Loan Parties’ Memo, supra note 138, at 7. 
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“borrow” the full amount allowed under their revolving line of credit.140 Second, 
management would dramatically increase the interest rate (from about 4.25 
percent to 14.25 percent) and extend the maturity date of the new debt without 
needing the permission of anyone other than the revolving lenders.141 Third, 
management would give the high interest, senior secured debt to the bondholders 
in a debt exchange that replaced $610 million in out-of-the-money unsecured 
debt with $305 million “borrowed” under the revolving line of credit.142 
In short, the firm would magically transform the bondholders, Cumulus’ 
unsecured creditors, into secured creditors through exploiting the right to obtain 
a senior credit line for working capital. The firm’s shareholders would benefit 
from this exchange, as it would decrease the firm’s overall debt. The firm’s term 
lenders, however, would see their rights against their collateral diluted by $209 
million.143 The term lenders reacted with fury and sued to block the exchange. 
After extensive litigation, the term lenders convinced a judge to enjoin the 
plan.144 
The failed Cumulus proposal was brazen. When the credit agreement was 
signed, Cumulus had bargained for certain rights that were meant to provide the 
firm with working capital in the event of financial distress. Presumably, ex ante, 
the lenders who extended the term loan did not anticipate, let alone consciously 
decide to assume the risk, that Cumulus would use these rights to refinance 
junior, unsecured bond debt and bootstrap such debt to a senior priority position. 
Cumulus’ strategy was not only based on an implausible reading of the credit 
agreement but also remarkably inconsistent with the underlying principles of 
secured lending. While the court eventually blocked Cumulus, the firm still 
wasted years pursuing dead-end restructuring strategies, incurring unnecessary 
litigation expense, and suffering unknown opportunity costs. 
3. Colt Holdings: Helpless Creditors in the Face of a Management Team 
Determined to Extract a Ransom for their Private Equity Sponsor 
In some cases, managers do not need to stand behind an improper reading 
of a contract to harm creditors. Instead, they can simply delay a restructuring, 
effectively holding the firm hostage to preserve shareholder option-value. 
Consider the conduct of Colt Holdings Company (Colt), the manufacturer of 
 
 140. See id. at 13. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 7–8. 
 144. See id. at 9. Most importantly, a provision in the credit agreement blocked Cumulus from 
taking actions that “materially and adversely” affected the interest of the term lenders. See Cumulus 
Complaint, supra note 136, at Exhibit A § 4.25 (“Cumulus Term Loan Agreement”). The amendment 
to the credit agreement was the removal of the financial ratio that allowed the firm to incur incremental 
secured debt as part of the debt exchange. The Term Lenders also argued that the credit agreement 
allowed the refinancing of the senior notes through the transaction Cumulus sought to effectuate. Id. 
§ 8.8(j); see Transcript of Proceedings at 90, Cumulus Media Holdings Inc., No. 16-cv-9591, 2017 WL 
1367233 [hereinafter Cumulus Transcript with Ruling]. 
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iconic “Colt” firearms. Colt endured a prolonged period of financial distress 
primarily because its private equity sponsor starved it for cash and left it unable 
to invest in improving its business. Management then tried to use Chapter 11 to 
protect the private equity firm’s investment while denying creditors their rightful 
recovery, in violation of foundational legal principles.145 This strategy did not 
work, and the case ended in predictable fashion but only after the legal and other 
administrative expenses consumed the money that the company might have 
otherwise used to modernize its operations. 
We include this case study because it further illustrates the limits of contract 
law as a serviceable protection for creditors. The sort of opportunistic conduct 
employed here—stalling, ignoring creditors in negotiations, and pursuing deals 
that were in the best interests of a deeply out-of-the-money shareholder while 
the firm deteriorated—seems virtually impossible to protect against via 
contractual covenants.146 Even though creditors were able to eventually prevail 
in litigation, there is no remedy at law to make them whole. 
Much of Colt’s debt originated from a leveraged buyout led by a private 
equity firm.147 For years, Colt’s equity sponsor exploited its ownership position 
to drain Colt of cash, and, as a result, little of the company’s cash flow was 
reinvested in the business. Between 2002 and 2014, the business distributed 
$241.3 million to the private equity sponsor.148 These transfers left Colt without 
 
 145.  See Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority 
Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1459 (1990) (discussing the priority that creditors have 
over shareholders). 
 146. It is possible to try to wrest control of a firm with an involuntary bankruptcy filing. See, e.g., 
In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., No. 15-10047 (KG), 2015 WL 495259, at *1 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 
2, 2015) (discussing the Caesar’s involuntary bankruptcy filing). But, in general, involuntary 
bankruptcies are very rare because lenders fear being held liable for damaging the business. See, e.g., 
David S. Kennedy et al., The Involuntary Bankruptcy Process: A Study of the Relevant Statutory and 
Procedural Provisions and Related Matters, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 51 (2000) (discussing the potential 
liability of petitioning creditors for damages if an involuntary petition is found to be in bad faith). 
 147. See Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization 
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 14, In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS (Bankr. D. 
Del. Nov. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Colt’s Disclosure Statement] (describing the 2013 merger with New 
Colt Holding Corp., a privately-held manufacturing affiliate of Colt Holdings Company). 
 148. See Colt Def. Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 21, 84 (June 3, 2005) (reporting 
that Colt Defense paid $36.4 million in distributions between 2002 and 2004 and reporting fees paid to 
its equity sponsor pursuant to a management agreement); Colt Defense LLC (Form S-4, Amendment 
No. 2), at 79, F-25 (Mar. 21, 2011) (reporting that Colt Defense paid $166 million in distributions 
between 2007 and 2010 and describing a “financial advisory agreement” with its equity sponsor); Colt 
Defense LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 63, 82 (Feb. 22, 2012); Colt Defense LLC, Annual Report 
(Form 10-K), at 90 (Mar. 25, 2013) (reporting that Colt Defense paid $21.2 million in distributions 
between 2010 and 2012); Colt Defense LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 39, 86-87 (Sept. 12, 
2014) (noting a decrease in cash distribution to members from $12.9 million in 2011 to $3.3 million in 
2012 and describing a “consulting agreement” with its equity sponsor). Additionally, the company 
passed on all of its tax attributes to its owner. See Keith A. Maib’s Declaration in Support of the Debtors’ 
Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Pleadings, In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS (Bankr. D. 
Del. June 15, 2015) [hereinafter Maib Declaration]. 
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the ability to keep up with its peers when it came to manufacturing automation 
and other research and development investments. 
In the fall of 2014, Colt’s capital structure included three forms of funded 
debt: (1) a secured revolving loan; (2) a secured term loan in the principal amount 
of $48 million; and (3) unsecured senior notes in the principal amount of $246 
million.149 The unsecured notes were then trading at a low price because of the 
market perception that Colt would have difficulty satisfying, among other 
obligations, an interest payment due on November 15.150 Anticipating a 
restructuring, the company’s noteholders organized and reached out to the 
company, offering “fresh capital on better terms than presently available” in the 
marketplace.151 The company did not immediately respond to the offer; instead, 
it refinanced its existing secured debt in a transaction that only gave it enough 
additional capital to make the November interest payment.152 
Two months later, Colt exchanged its senior secured revolving line of credit 
with a $33 million term loan.153 The new term loan did not increase Colt’s 
liquidity and, by comparison to its prior borrowing arrangement, imposed higher 
capital costs and tightened covenants.154 The noteholders again wrote to Colt, 
“respectfully urg[ing] the Board to change course, and start working towards a 
more consensual and value-accretive resolution.”155 Colt’s written reply was 
terse and, again, dismissive.156 
On April 1, 2015, Colt filed a notice with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) indicating that it would not be making its required securities 
filings on time. 157 The filing said that Colt is “unable to provide an expected 
date” for resuming SEC compliance.158 And on April 14, 2015, Colt made an 
aggressive offer to its noteholders, offering to give them junior secured claims if 
 
 149. See Colt Defense LLC, Quarterly Report for Sept. 28, 2014 (Form 10-Q/A), at 23–45 (Dec. 
2, 2014). 
 150. See Colt Defense Bondholder Group Advised by Brown Rudnick, GLC, Awaits Numbers, 
REORG-RESEARCH (Nov. 19, 2014), https://platform.beta.reorg-
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In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015) [hereinafter Han Declaration]. 
 152. See Supplemental Objection of Ad Hoc Consortium of Holders of Senior Notes to Debtors’ 
DIP Motion ¶ 20, In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015) [hereinafter 
Supplemental Objection to Colt’s Debtors’ DIP Motion]; Colt Defense LLC, Current Report (Form 8-
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facility on November 17, 2014, days after receiving the letter from the noteholders). 
 153. See Colt Defense LLC, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 9, 2015) (describing Colt 
Defense’s entry into a credit agreement with Cortland Capital Market Services). 
 154. See id.; Supplemental Objection to Colt’s Debtors’ DIP Motion, supra note 152, ¶ 23. 
 155. See Han Declaration, supra note 151, at Exhibit P. 
 156. See Supplemental Objection to Colt’s Debtors’ DIP Motion, supra note 152, ¶ 25. 
 157. In particular, Colt announced that it would not be timely filing its 2014 10-K statement. See 
Colt Defense LLC, Notification of Late Filing (Form 12b-25) (Apr. 1, 2015). 
 158. See id. 
770 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  108:745 
they would reduce the amount they were owed by 70 percent.159 Notably, the 
firm’s private equity owner was not offering to take any losses of its own under 
the proposal.160 The offer also contained a disclosure intended to threaten the 
noteholders: the private equity sponsor also owned the building that housed 
Colt’s only manufacturing facility; the private equity sponsor leased that facility 
to Colt; and the lease was about to expire.161 The disclosure went on to say that 
Colt’s equity sponsor had the power to deny lease renewal and cause great harm 
to the business, implying that the private equity owner could evict Colt if the 
exchange offer that would allow them to maintain their investment failed.162 
Notwithstanding the eviction threat, the exchange offer was soundly rejected by 
the noteholders.163 
The noteholders then made a counteroffer that would give Colt new cash, 
but at a price: the equity sponsor would have to give up its ownership of the 
company.164 The proposal was rejected out of hand.165 When asked if the 
company would support any plan that transferred ownership from the equity 
sponsor to noteholders, one company representative allegedly responded: “Hell 
no!”166 The only alternative to the debt exchange was, as allegedly stated by the 
same representative, “litigat[ion].”167 
On June 14, 2015, Colt filed for Chapter 11 relief in Delaware.168 The 
bankruptcy filing kicked off intense litigation, as noteholders successfully fought 
the equity sponsor’s attempt to remain in control of the firm.169 In the end, 
 
 159. The offer contained other problematic terms. Under the exchange offer, old notes would be 
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noteholders were forced to cede about 20 percent of the firm’s post-bankruptcy 
equity to the pre-bankruptcy equity sponsor, given its ownership of Colt’s 
factory, but they otherwise became the owners of the firm.170 
In certain respects, the restructuring outcome was consistent with what one 
might have expected. The firm entered Chapter 11 and exited with less debt and 
owned by its pre-bankruptcy creditors. But management’s attempts to save the 
equity sponsor’s investment meant that the outcome came at a tremendous cost: 
the firm’s financial condition deteriorated significantly because management 
insisted on delaying the restructuring to provide the equity sponsor with more 
bargaining power. In fact, the money that Colt borrowed in the bankruptcy, 
which could have been spent modernizing its business, was instead spent 
covering costs of bankruptcy and continuing operating status quo. Indeed, the 
post-petition professional costs of the debtor’s lawyers alone amounted to more 
than $14.5 million.171 Colt never received the financing needed for long overdue 
R&D and automation, and left bankruptcy without improving its competitive 
position.172 While contract law can do many things for creditors, it cannot protect 
against a management team determined to stall and delay bankruptcy and a bona 
fide restructuring to the point that the firm itself is damaged. 
B. The Limits of Relying on Bankruptcy Law to Protect Investors 
Bankruptcy law is often cited as a body of law that protects creditors.173 
But bankruptcy law has multiple policy goals, some of which, especially 
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of Such Sale, and (V) Granting Certain Related Relief; and (B) an Order Approving the Sale of 
Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets ¶ 13, In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS. Second, Colt 
filed a motion seeking to approve a debtor-in-possession financing from its pre-petition first lien lender, 
which required the firm to close on the Section 363 sale within 60 days. See Motion to Approve Debtor 
In Possession Financing, In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS. 
 170. The global settlement had many moving pieces: (1) the DIP loan was “rolled” into a new 
first lien term loan; (2) the second lien debt was rolled into a new second lien term loan; (3) incremental 
liquidity ($50 million) was raised by rights offering to noteholders (supplying $45 million) and the 
equity sponsor (supplying $5 million); (4) the lease on the manufacturing facility was extended; and (5) 
equity was divided between noteholders (83.25 percent) and the equity sponsor (16.75 percent). See 
Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into and Perform Under the 
Restructuring Support Agreement, In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS. 
 171. See Omnibus Order Awarding Final Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered 
and for Reimbursement of Expenses at Exhibit A, In re Colt Holding Co., No. 15-11296-LSS. 
 172. One of the peculiar aspects of this story is that Colt’s board was not dominated by self-
interested employees of the equity sponsor and close affiliates. In fact, the board majority was comprised 
of two military generals, two union representatives, and a retired restructuring lawyer See Maib 
Declaration, supra note 148, ¶ 48. It is entirely possible that this otherwise disinterested board hewed 
closely to Gheewalla and its progeny, using the maturing lease to justify taking actions like proposing 
restructuring transactions that would leave control in the hands of the equity sponsor while denying the 
noteholders the benefit of their bargain. 
 173.  See generally In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
bankruptcy law protects the interests of creditors as a whole). 
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protecting corporations and their employees, can loom larger for judges than the 
need to give pre-bankruptcy creditors the benefit of their bargain. The need to 
protect the firm loomed particularly large after the financial crisis shook the 
economy to the core, creating a body of precedent that has further eroded creditor 
rights. The cases below all involve extreme facts, but they also involve managers 
playing bankruptcy hardball in defiance of the bargained-for protections of 
creditors and equitable principles. 
In the first case study, General Growth Properties, we show how ex ante 
contractual arrangements often yield to other bankruptcy policy goals, such as 
protecting jobs and promoting reorganization. In the second case study, 
American Safety Razor, we show how these other policy priorities can create 
space for opportunism such as, in that case, a potentially rigged auction process. 
The Lyondell example shows how a well-advised management team’s deft 
understanding of bankruptcy policy priorities and procedural rules can rob 
creditors of rights they would have had outside of bankruptcy. 
1. General Growth Properties: How the Creditor Bargain May Yield to 
Other Bankruptcy Policy Goals 
General Growth Properties (GGP), one of the largest owners and operators 
of shopping centers in the country, historically financed its commercial real 
estate at the project level, borrowing for each venture against the particular assets 
being developed.174 Such loans generally had terms of three to seven years, thus 
the company’s “business plan was based on the premise it would be able to 
refinance the debt” whenever circumstances required.175 
To this end, GGP and its lenders set up a very specific lending structure, 
with the goal of achieving “asset isolation”—the separation of a high-quality real 
estate asset from the rest of the conglomerate.176 To simplify things, the typical 
“bankruptcy-remote” structure was as follows. A wholly-owned GGP subsidiary 
entity owned specific real estate assets, financed with loans. A representative 
example was Stonestown Shopping Center L.P., which owned a mall in San 
Francisco, CA.177 In order to protect their collateral interests, the lenders required 
GGP to separate the San Francisco mall from the rest of the conglomerate, which 
GGP agreed to do in exchange for lower interest rates.178 Importantly, each 
subsidiary board had to consist of a majority of “independent managers” who 
 
 174. See In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43, 53–54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 175. See id. at 53. 
 176. See Motion of ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) to 
Dismiss the Cases of Bakersfield Mall LLC; Rasccap Realty, Ltd.; Visalia Mall, L.P.; GGP-Tucson 
Mall L.L.C; Lancaster Trust; Ho Retail Properties II Limited Partnership; RS Properties Inc.; 
Stonestown Shopping Center L.P.; and Fashion Place, LLC at 2, 9, In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 
43 (No. 09-11977-alg) [hereinafter ING Clarion Motion]. 
 177. See id. at 9. 
 178. See id. at 1. 
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essentially represented the lender’s interests.179 As the law requires the board of 
each subsidiary to separately approve its bankruptcy filing, this structure was 
designed to ensure that the conglomerate could not drag the isolated asset into a 
larger GGP bankruptcy and thereby help fund the reorganization of other parts 
of the conglomerate.180 The lender sought this protection to avoid being delayed 
for repayment or having its rights prejudiced as assets were diverted to fund 
affiliate bankruptcies.181 
In the wake of the financial crisis, GGP was unable to refinance its debt and 
the firm’s financial distress worsened.182 The management team’s reaction was 
unprecedented. They took steps to unwind the “asset isolation” structure, force 
each subsidiary to file for bankruptcy, and thereby keep the conglomerate 
together—and the company’s senior managers in their jobs.183 The steps taken 
were dramatic. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 16, 2009, GGP’s managers 
fired the independent directors at each subsidiary via email and, once control was 
fully established, initiated the collective bankruptcy proceedings.184 The 
bankruptcy filings and the violation of the “asset isolation” structure 
immediately roiled the credit markets.185 
GGP’s various project lenders now found themselves in exactly the 
situation they had contractually sought to avoid.186 They asked the bankruptcy 
court to dismiss the subsidiary bankruptcy petitions as bad faith filings.187 They 
also alleged that management’s actions had violated their particular obligor 
 
 179. See Motion of FRM Funding Company, Inc. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), to Dismiss 
the Chapter 11 Case of Fox River Shopping Center, LLC at 6–7, In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 
43 (No. 09-11977-alg) [hereinafter FRM Motion] (noting the “independent managers” were generally 
required to be appointed by a nationally recognized company that provides professional independent 
directors, managers and trustees). 
 180. See id. at 7 (noting a typical operating agreement (the equivalent to the corporate charter) 
had a provision requiring the independent directors to consider the interests of the subsidiary and its 
creditors in deciding whether to file for bankruptcy. This structure was designed to get around the 
unenforceability of a contract that directly restricts a corporation’s ability to file for bankruptcy). 
 181. See id. at 15. 
 182. See In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 53 (describing how the 2008 crisis in commercial 
mortgage-backed securities markets impaired the company’s ability to refinance its debt). At the time 
of its bankruptcy filing, the accounting value of GGP’s assets was nearly $30 billion supporting more 
than $27 billion in liabilities. Id. at 48. 
 183. See ING Clarion Motion, supra note 176, at 2–3. 
 184. See id. 
 185. General Growth Properties, Inc. Decision Notes Weaknesses of Securitization Special 
Purpose Entities, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Aug. 13, 2009), 
https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/publications/general-growth-properties-inc-
decision-notes-weaknesses-of-securitization-special-purpose-entities/ [https://perma.cc/YY4X-
WWFK] (“This decision should serve as a cautionary tale for those involved in structuring SPE and 
CMBS transactions.”). 
 186. Id. (explaining that “the debtors subject to the motions to dismiss were structured to be SPEs 
so that project-level entities would be bankruptcy-remote,” but “[t]he SPE structures failed to keep the 
project-level entities out of bankruptcy”). 
 187. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 47 (“The primary ground on which dismissal is 
sought is that the Subject Debtors’ cases were filed in bad faith.”). 
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firm’s fiduciary duties.188 The bankruptcy judge recognized that the “asset 
isolation” structure had been set up to “create impediments to a bankruptcy 
filing.”189 However, given that the subsidiaries were solvent—hence the need for 
their assets to fund the bankruptcy—the court found that the only fiduciary duty 
that the subsidiary boards owed was to their shareholders, and the shareholder 
was in each case the parent corporation that needed their assets to reorganize.190 
Similarly, the court found that the dead-of-night dismissal of the independent 
directors did not constitute bad faith, given that the subsidiaries’ organizational 
documents allowed GGP to do so.191 
This scenario illustrates how, in bankruptcy, larger business goals and 
practical necessity can overwhelm the creditor bargain. The GGP structure 
reflected clear risk allocation: the project lenders agreed to provide capital at 
more attractive rates than was otherwise available in the market, in exchange for 
particular “asset isolation” protections. That bargain was not honored, the 
lenders pleaded with the bankruptcy court to enforce their deal, and the 
bankruptcy court was unmoved. Unlike the other case studies discussed in this 
Article, GGP’s case did not involve a salacious form of control opportunism, and 
its facts were highly unusual. But, the case outcome reflects a lesson of far 
greater reach: the bankruptcy court is, by nature, a hospitable forum for debtors, 
and the process intends to follow management’s lead, at least at inception. 
Generally speaking, in this tug of war, the individual creditor bargain does not 
have equal footing with the debtor’s larger restructuring goals. 
2. American Safety Razor: How Management’s Control Over the Case 
Narrative Further Enables Opportunism 
The bankruptcy of American Safety Razor LLC (ASR) also provides 
lessons on how the bankruptcy process can be exploited to thwart the creditor 
bargain. As we describe below, management’s guiding interest as the firm fell 
into insolvency may have been preserving their own jobs. The firm’s managers 
appear to have silently advanced an opportunistic agenda, which they almost 
succeeded in doing. While the stealthy maneuvering was exposed and disabled, 
it took an unusual and unlikely constellation of circumstances for that to happen. 
The story provides a useful example of how a management team can spin a 
narrative to profit at the expense of creditors: the need to exit bankruptcy 
 
 188. See id. at 63 (noting that the Operating Agreements of the project lenders provide that 
Independent Managers owe a “fiduciary duty of loyalty and care” when performing their duties under 
the agreement). 
 189. See id. at 63–64. 
 190. Id. at 64 (finding that Delaware law “provides that the directors of a solvent corporation are 
authorized—indeed, required—to consider the interests of the shareholders in exercising their fiduciary 
duties” and finding that the managers did not breach their fiduciary duties by “voting to file based on 
the interests of the Group”). 
 191. Id. at 68. 
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immediately to avoid the firm’s value melting away, an immediate auction 
required for financing, and manipulation of said auction. 
ASR was in the business of manufacturing disposable wet-shave razors for 
personal consumption.192 ASR was a major player in the “private label” razor 
business, manufacturing razors that stores would sell under their own brand.193 
In late 2009, ASR appeared to be more than able to weather the financial crisis 
and pay the interest and principal on approximately $240 million in first lien 
secured debt and $175 million in second lien secured debt.194 However, in late 
2009, ASR learned that its largest customer would be discontinuing the business 
relationship, thereby throwing the firm into turmoil and triggering defaults under 
the firm’s first and second lien debt contracts.195 
The firm soon entered pre-bankruptcy negotiations with ad hoc committees 
of first and second lien lenders.196 As the “junior” option-holder, the ad hoc 
committee of second lien lenders had strong incentives to make sure that 
management did not collude with senior lenders to disadvantage their claims. 
The second lien lenders soon engaged Goldman Sachs to try to refinance the first 
lien debt.197 Shortly thereafter, Goldman Sachs issued a letter stating that it was 
“highly confident” that it could arrange and syndicate “$300 million” in new 
debt capital for the company, which would be more than enough to repay the 
first lien lenders, leaving the second lien lenders as the firm’s new owners.198 
Nevertheless, the letter warned that, in order to realize this expectation, Goldman 
Sachs would require “reasonable time to market the Financing with the 
assistance of management of the Company.”199 Instead, a few weeks later—
while the refinancing process was still underway—ASR filed for Chapter 11 
relief in Delaware.200  
It quickly became clear why ASR had filed for Chapter 11 so suddenly: it 
had another plan in mind, one that offered particular benefits for the company’s 
management team. With the Chapter 11 petition, ASR immediately sought 
permission to sell all of its assets to the first lien lenders after a quick auction 
 
 192. See Affidavit of J. Andrew Bolt, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of 
American Safety Razor Company, LLC and Blade Acquisition Company, and Vice President and 
Authorized Officer of the Other Debtors, in Support of First Day Motions at 4, 6, In re Am. Safety Razor 
Co., No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2010) [hereinafter First Day Affidavit]. 
 193. See id. at 6 (noting that ASR products are “primarily sold under a retailer’s store brand”). 
 194. See id. at 9. 
 195. See id. at 11. 
 196. See id. at 14–15. 
 197. See id. at 16–17. 
 198. Energizer Holdings, Inc.’s Objection to Second Lien Lenders’ Application for Allowance 
of an Administrative Claim at Exhibit A ¶ 8, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. 
June 23, 2011) [hereinafter Energizer’s Objection]. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Objection of Blackrock Kelso Capital Corp. and GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds 
Management LLC, as Collateral Manager, to Debtors’ Motions for Orders Approving: (1) Proposed 
Post-Petition Financing, and (2) Terms of the Debtors’ Retention of Lazard Middle Market LLC at 4, In 
re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. June 23, 2011). 
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process.201 The auction used a framework in which the first lien lenders were the 
stalking horse bidders with a “credit bid,” where the first lien lenders would not 
pay any money at all. Instead, they would simply waive their claim against the 
debtor. This meant that any superior bid would need to be made in cash and 
higher than the $240 million in first lien debt. As part of their credit bid, the first 
lien lenders promised to assume the employment agreements of management, 
guaranteeing them continued employment or lucrative severance.202 
In considering the motion, the bankruptcy judge confronted a decision 
environment where the debtor had decisively tilted in their favor.203 She found 
herself confronted by a management team that claimed that the sale was needed 
to preserve the company’s approximately 1,700 employees.204 Time was of the 
essence, management said, because the firm’s major selling season ended in 
October—meaning the firm, which filed for bankruptcy at the very end of July, 
needed to emerge in a matter of weeks in order to have a viable business.205 In 
effect, management claimed to have waited so long to file for bankruptcy that 
the judge had no alternative but to approve the financing and sale motions.206 If 
the judge forced management to explore alternatives, she might put 1,700 
people207 out of jobs in the midst of the most difficult job market in decades.208 
The second lien lenders would likely be of little help, as they were bound by an 
intercreditor agreement that prohibited them from objecting to any asset sale 
supported by the first lien lenders.209 
 
 201. See Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and 
Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 6004, 6006, for Entry of an Order (A) Approving the Sale of Substantially All 
of the Debtors’ Assets Free and Clear of Encumbrances and (B) Authorizing the Assumption and 
Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases at 19–20, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., 
No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2010) [hereinafter ASR Debtors’ Sale Motion]. 
 202. See id. at 10–11; id. at Exhibit B, Part 2 § 7.16 (providing twelve-month employment 
guarantees to existing employees along with “substantially comparable bonuses”); see also Transcript 
of Proceedings from September 28, 2010 at 139:5–14:4, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-12351 
(Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 1, 2010) (noting Energizer bid expressly carves out similar employment protections 
and Energizer marked up the first lien lenders’ purchase agreement to reserve right to terminate 
employees). 
 203. To support the sale motion and the credit bid, the debtor also sought permission to borrow 
$25 million in post-petition financing from the first lien lenders. See ASR Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363, 364, and 507 (I) Authorizing Debtors (A) To Obtain Postpetition 
Financing and (B) To Utilize Cash Collateral; (II) Granting Liens and Providing Super-Priority 
Administrative Expense Status; (III) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties; and 
(IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing at 1, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. July 
28, 2010) [hereinafter ASR DIP Motion]. 
 204. See generally ASR First Day Affidavit, supra note 192 (emphasizing the need to leave 
bankruptcy quickly to keep the firm from collapsing during its key selling seasons). 
 205. See id. at 18. 
 206. See generally id. (emphasizing that time is of essence). 
 207. See id. at 8. 
 208. See ASR DIP Motion, supra note 203. 
 209. Transcript of Proceedings from 9/30/2010 at 94–95, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-
12351 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2010) [hereinafter ASR 9/30 Transcript]. 
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Management then set about designing an auction process that gave them 
full control over the process. Every bidder was required to sign a confidentiality 
agreement in order to bid, which gave the company the ability to hide the identity 
of bidders as well as terms offered.210 A month after bidding had begun, a news 
service suddenly reported that Energizer Holdings, Inc. (Energizer) had extended 
a $300 to $325 million cash bid for the company as part of the bankruptcy auction 
process.211 This was news to the second lien lenders: their committee did not 
receive notice from ASR that Energizer had submitted a bid, and Energizer was 
contractually prohibited by ASR to relay that information to the second lien 
committee.212 But, to ASR, this was not news at all: ASR had rejected 
Energizer’s bid out of hand.213 ASR would later argue in court that its decision 
was justified because Energizer’s bid was fraught with antitrust risk, an 
important reason to prefer the first lien lenders’ otherwise lower credit bid.214 
They would also deny the second lien lenders’ allegations that ASR’s stated 
antitrust concern was mere façade, that the real motivation behind rejecting the 
bid was ASR’s understanding that Energizer, which intended to merge ASR into 
its Schick subsidiary, simply would not want ASR’s historical management 
team.215 
The second lien lenders promptly filed an aggressive objection to the sale 
motion, ignoring any restraints under the intercreditor agreement and 
commencing fierce litigation.216 Management responded with charges of bad 
faith and tried to stop both the second lien lenders and Energizer from appearing 
in bankruptcy court, threatening to seek damages from the second lien lenders 
for breach of their intercreditor agreement and Energizer for breach of the non-
disclosure agreement.217 Nevertheless, during the court proceeding, the second 
lien lenders introduced evidence and presented expert witness testimony to 
support its contention that Energizer’s bid was much higher than the first lien 
lenders’ bid, that there was no meaningful antitrust risk, and, more to the point, 
that management was abusing its position of control.218 The court found that 
ASR had, in fact, acted inappropriately by ejecting Energizer from the bidding 
 
 210. See Transcript of Proceedings from 9/29/2010 at 77–86, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-
12351 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter ASR 9/29 Transcript]. 
 211. See Energizer’s Objection, supra note 198, at Exhibit A ¶ 19. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. at Exhibit A ¶ 20. 
 214. See ASR 9/29 Transcript, supra note 210, at 18–20. 
 215. See ASR 9/30 Transcript, supra note 209, at 18. 
 216. See Objection of the Second-Lien Lenders to the Debtors’ Sale Motion, and Emergency 
Cross-Motion Requesting: (I) Authority to Commence an Investigation of the Debtors’ Auction Process 
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004; (II) Appointment of an Examiner; and/or (III) Appointment of a 
Chapter II Trustee at 1, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter Objection to ASR’s Sales Motion]. 
 217. See ASR 9/30 Transcript, supra note 209, at 25, 50. 
 218. See 9/29 Transcript, supra note 210, at 74–92. 
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process and, as a remedy, continued the sale hearing for eight days to afford 
Energizer the opportunity to finalize its offer for the company.219 
At the subsequent hearing, Energizer presented a final bid that offered to 
repay the first lien debt in full, assume all administrative and unsecured claims, 
and provide $57 million—about a 31 percent cash distribution—for the second 
lien lenders.220 Remarkably, ASR and the first lien lenders continued their 
strenuous opposition to the Energizer bid, which the bankruptcy court 
overruled.221 Energizer’s “hostile” bid closed a few weeks later, no antitrust 
problems materialized, and members of management were terminated soon 
thereafter. 222 
This story seemingly has a happy ending: control opportunism was 
thwarted and value did ultimately flow in a manner seemingly consistent with 
the pre-petition bargain. But, that was as much dumb luck as anything else. It 
took a news service reporting a bid that was otherwise hidden by confidentiality 
agreement, as well as a group of sufficiently angry second lien lenders who not 
only had the courage of their convictions but also the patience and willingness 
to fund a fight on such hostile terrain. When the news of Energizer’s bid leaked, 
ASR immediately threatened a fierce battle in all directions. Many potential 
bidders and creditors would have simply moved on, deterred by the rhetoric and 
a seemingly rigged process. As such, the lesson of the case is not so much found 
in the ultimate case outcome; rather, it is found in observing how management 
can employ Machiavellian strategies behind the scenes that, with any luck, will 
forever remain hidden. Moreover, there can be no assurance that the second lien 
lenders did, in fact, receive the true inherent value of their bargain. There was, 
after all, no real auction process, Energizer or other potential bidders spurned by 
the process might have been willing to pay more,223 and the significant fees 
charged by ASR’s lawyers were ultimately borne by the second lien lenders. 
3. Lyondell: How Debtors and Lenders Can Take Advantage of Rules of 
Bankruptcy Law to Neuter Fraudulent Transfer Claims 
In addition to contract and bankruptcy law, the Gheewalla court also cited 
fraudulent transfer law as rendering equitable protections for creditors 
unnecessary. Fraudulent transfer law provides creditors a cause of action when 
 
 219. See 9/30 Transcript, supra note 209, at 37–41. 
 220. See generally Notice of Filing of Energizer Holdings, Inc’s Revised Bid at Exhibit A, B, In 
re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2010). 
 221. Hilary Russ, Energizer Wins American Safety Razor With $301M Bids, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 
2010), https://www.law360.com/articles/200242/energizer-wins-american-safety-razor-with-301m-
bid/ [https://perma.cc/2E3P-MRPQ]. 
 222. See id. 
 223. Energizer had signaled it was to continue to participate in bidding, but they never had any 
reason to raise their bid. See generally Notice of Energizer Holdings, Inc.’s Continued Interest to 
Participate in Sale Process and to Consummate Transaction, In re Am. Safety Razor Co., No. 10-12351 
(Bankr. D. Del. July 28, 2010). 
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firms intentionally or constructively strip the firm of assets to the detriment of 
existing creditors. As an initial matter, the case law consistently shows 
weaknesses in fraudulent transfer theory as a creditor remedy.224 But, more to 
the point, bankruptcy law provides managers with a toolkit to neuter fraudulent 
transfer claims. In addition to the now standard method of using bankruptcy 
financing to handcuff management’s discretion, management also has the ability 
to settle fraudulent transfer claims without the permission of the creditor who 
suffered the loss as a result of the conveyance. This is due to an anomaly in 
corporate law. While creditors can bring fraudulent transfer claims on their own 
outside of bankruptcy, inside Chapter 11 the debtor-in-possession (DIP) can 
control all property of the estate, including fraudulent transfer claims.225 Courts 
have held that this control includes the right to settle those claims, even if the 
true plaintiff-creditor who was harmed by the conveyance opposes the settlement 
on the grounds that it is far too low.226 
In other words, managers can use bankruptcy law to strip creditors of rights 
they would have had outside of bankruptcy. The basic problem with the 
prosecution of fraudulent transfer claims in bankruptcy is that a debtor in 
bankruptcy is controlled by a management team that seeks to ensure the quickest 
bankruptcy and the brightest future for the debtor—goals that often conflict with 
a fulsome prosecution of fraudulent transfer remedies. In some asset-stripping 
transactions, the defendants in a fraudulent transfer are also the party providing 
post-bankruptcy financing to the debtor. This means leverage over management 
and, in certain situations, the ability to choke the procedural rights of unsecured 
creditors. While the debtor’s actions are subject to court review, the legal 
standards invariably require the judge to consider the best interest of the debtor’s 
other constituencies, such as current and future employees and managers. This 
particular fragility opens the door for control opportunism, as reflected in the 
Chapter 11 case of Lyondell Bassell. 
In December 2007, chemical giant Bassell AF S.C.A. acquired Lyondell 
AF S.C.A. (Lyondell) in a textbook leveraged buyout (LBO) funded with $21 
billion in new secured borrowings from a group of investors (the LBO Lenders) 
 
 224. Consider the Tribune LBO fraudulent transfer litigation. The LBO took place in 2007 and 
the Chapter 11 filing occurred in 2008. Fraudulent transfer litigation was initiated in 2011. In a July 
2018 Wall Street Journal article, which referred to the LBO litigation as a “classic of the [] genre,” Judge 
Kevin Carey was quoted as saying “it doesn’t sound like we are very close [to the end of the litigation].” 
See Peg Brickley, Judge Pushes Settlement Talks in Tribune LBO Court Fight, WALL STREET J. (Jul. 
10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-pushes-settlement-talks-in-tribune-lbo-court-fight-
1531257092/ [https://perma.cc/JZ5A-HCTY]. If a “classic of the genre” is alive eight and a half years 
(and counting) and still nowhere near the end, it hardly can be seen as a reliable buttress for the creditor’s 
bargain. 
 225.   See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics 
Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 572 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the need to allow creditors to bring the 
fraudulent transfer claims that otherwise are controlled by the Chapter 11 debtor as derivative actions). 
 226.   See In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 271–72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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heaped on top of the firm’s already extant $3.1 billion in unsecured debt.227 The 
combined firm competed in a cyclical, investment-heavy petrochemical industry, 
and the heavy debt burden left the firm vulnerable to weakening in its core 
business.228 Merely twelve weeks after closing the transaction, Lyondell began 
to run out of cash.229 As the Great Recession ravaged the economy, Lyondell 
collapsed into bankruptcy in January 2009. This put Lyondell’s $3.1 billion in 
prior unsecured bonds in a desperate position, sitting behind $21 billion in 
secured debt owed to LBO Lenders.230 Given that the LBO cash went to the 
historical shareholders, but the debtors remained liable on transaction-related 
secured debt, the LBO transaction thus had the effect of stripping Lyondell of 
substantial value.231 
These facts would seem to lend themselves to a textbook fraudulent transfer 
claim, with pre-LBO unsecured creditors hoping to avoid liens transferred to the 
secured lenders and the $12.5 billion paid to old Lyondell shareholders.232 LBO 
Lenders would, however, be able to exploit bargaining power to secure from 
management a release of their fraudulent transfer exposure for a relatively small 
amount—all with the blessing of the bankruptcy judge. 
Like most large firms, Lyondell’s management team began bankruptcy by 
seeking a DIP loan to fund the bankruptcy case.233 Lyondell, like most firms in 
the modern era of secured credit,234 arrived in bankruptcy with liens fully 
encumbering all of its assets—in this case, the liens of the lenders that funded 
the LBO. In practice, lenders seldom agree to fund reorganizations without 
obtaining a priming lien,235 which generally requires the consent of the existing 
 
 227. See In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 503 B.R. 348, 353 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), as corrected 
(Jan. 16, 2014), abrogated by In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
 228. See Complaint at 3, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 503 B.R. 348 (No. 09-10023). 
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lienholder. This effective veto right means that the existing senior secured lender 
is the only plausible DIP lender because they can veto any other loan.236 
In this case, the senior secured lenders exploited their right to provide DIP 
financing to defend preemptively their liens against fraudulent transfer claims 
and acquire what the pre-LBO unsecured creditors would later condemn as “near 
total influence over the management of the[] bankruptcy cases.”237 The lenders 
grew their influence through attaching seven conditions to the DIP financing. 
First, they limited the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ (the “Official 
Committee”) lien investigation budget to $250,000, a paltry sum in comparison 
to the more than $20 million that would ultimately be spent. Second, they allotted 
that committee about four months to investigate the facts surrounding the 
LBO.238 Third, they required Lyondell to exit bankruptcy within ten months—a 
herculean task for one of the largest corporate failures in history in the midst of 
historic financial dislocation.239 Fourth, they sought and obtained new collateral 
for $3.25 billion of the existing secured debt: the proceeds of avoidance actions. 
Fifth, they demanded a variety of additional contractual covenants, which had 
the effect of giving them control over management, especially including the right 
to recommend a change in management.240 Sixth, the debtors agreed to pay the 
litigation costs of the bank defendants in any fraudulent transfer action.241 
Seventh, the debtor agreed to waive their right to prosecute the fraudulent 
transfer actions on behalf of the estate, leaving the official committee to do so 
with a very limited budget.242 
Combined, these provisions of the DIP order dramatically weakened the 
ability of pre-LBO unsecured creditors to prosecute fraudulent transfer claims. 
The bankruptcy code expects the Official Committee to prosecute these actions 
on their behalf, but the Official Committee would have almost no time to marshal 
evidence for the most persuasive complaint, and their professionals would not 
get paid for their work associated with doing so once the $250,000 budget was 
exhausted. Moreover, the fraudulent transfer claims would need to be resolved 
for the firm to exit bankruptcy, and the lenders provided a very short runway for 
that to happen. 
Thus, the LBO Lenders could exploit the debtors’ need to obtain financing 
to fortify their ability to defend against fraudulent transfer liability. In evaluating 
requests to finance the case, the judge must find, among other things, that: (1) 
the proposed financing is an exercise of sound business judgment; (2) the 
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financing is in the best interests of the estate and its creditors; (3) the financing 
is necessary to preserve the estate’s assets; (4) the loan’s terms were fair; and (5) 
the financing was negotiated in good faith.243 Of these factors, only the second 
considers the interests of unsecured creditors directly, and the judge was allowed 
to, as he did, find that the restrictions on the Official Committee’s ability to 
prosecute the fraudulent transfer actions were reasonable products of 
management’s business judgment and desire to secure DIP financing.244 After 
all, management represented to the court that the failure to approve the financing 
“would likely result in liquidation, severe employee dislocation and crippling 
losses for vendors and customers.”245 It is not surprising that avoiding that 
liquidation was more important to the judge than protecting pre-LBO unsecured 
creditors. 
To be sure, the bankruptcy judge did provide the Official Committee with 
some bargaining power. The court granted the Official Committee permission to 
prosecute the claims, which was granted on an accelerated schedule that 
Lyondell’s management demanded to ensure the firm could exit Chapter 11 
expeditiously.246 The parties agreed to conclude discovery and conduct a bench 
trial in a few months on the extremely complicated, fact-intensive, fraudulent 
transfer issues. 
However, bankruptcy law gave the debtor’s management team the power 
to settle the claim without the input of the Official Committee.247 That power 
would ultimately undermine the Official Committee’s ability to litigate. 
Lyondell’s management team took several steps that had the effect of 
reducing the ability of the Official Committee to procure a favorable settlement. 
First, prior to the hearing on the Official Committee’s motion to prosecute the 
fraudulent transfer claims, the debtors asserted that, even though the Official 
Committee had the right to prosecute the claims, they believed they had the 
power to settle them since the causes of action ultimately belonged to the 
bankruptcy estate.248 In other words, the Official Committee, representing the 
class of aggrieved pre-bankruptcy creditors, could see the claims settled by a 
party whose major motivation was to exit bankruptcy. In a private email, the lead 
lawyer for the debtors assured a major secured lender that he would deploy the 
right to settle the claim when “[our] leverage [is] greatest.”249 
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Management also effectively granted the LBO banks the ability to “hold-
up” a $22 billion restructuring by making them the provider of exit financing. 
Obviously, the LBO defendants refused to prosecute any fraudulent transfer 
claims by any plan of reorganization they were funding, which meant the claims 
had to be settled for the firm to leave bankruptcy.250 As the Official Committee’s 
lawyers built their case for trial, management’s lawyers monitored all 
depositions but refused to meet with the Official Committee’s lawyers to 
understand their view of the strength of the claims.251 
The debtors then shocked the Official Committee by announcing that they 
had settled the fraudulent transfer claims for $300 million, which the official 
committee saw as a “lowball settlement” that paid unsecured creditors a fraction 
of the $3.2 billion they were owed.252 Notably, the debtors never asserted that 
they settled the claims for “as much as possible,”253 but rather that the settlement 
would “permit the reorganization to proceed” while “ensuring the unsecured 
creditors a very fair recovery.”254 They accused the unsecured creditors, who 
strenuously opposed the settlement, of “gambling with the future of 
LyondellBassell and nearly 16,000 jobs as well.”255 Perhaps telegraphing how 
he would rule, at the hearing when the settlement was initially announced, the 
bankruptcy judge reaffirmed that “[the bankruptcy court’s] highest responsibility 
is to ensure that our patient doesn’t die on the operating table.”256 
Because of the permissive common law tests whose key is 
“reasonableness” of the debtor’s proposal to settle claims in bankruptcy, the 
debtors could obtain judicial approval merely by showing it was reasonable 
given the various risks and uncertainties associated with the litigation. Further, 
the caselaw expressly allowed management to “consider the good of the entire 
enterprise” in proposing a settlement, not just the unsecured creditors.257 As part 
of the judge’s reasonableness analysis, he was required to consider “the 
complexity, expense and likely duration of [the] litigation” as well as the balance 
to the firm itself in being able to exit bankruptcy in a prompt manner.258 In 
support of the settlement, management asserted that “only the [prosecution of 
fraudulent transfer claims] stand[] between the company and [leaving 
bankruptcy]; only the [prosecution of fraudulent transfer claims] poses the threat 
of liquidation.”259 Under the pressure of the debtors’ settlement motion, the 
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committee settled the claims for an additional $150 million, agreeing to release 
the LBO lenders from any additional liability.260 
In conclusion, the story of Lyondell shows how procedural machinations 
and a determined management team can cripple the prosecution of a potentially 
valuable fraudulent transfer claim. Lyondell engaged in a risky leveraged buyout 
that stripped the firm of assets, leaving its pre-bankruptcy unsecured creditors 
buried under $20 billion in debt that put it into bankruptcy barely a year later. 
When the Official Committee attempted to prosecute those claims on behalf of 
unsecured creditors, the committee members found themselves given mere 
months to build a case that would normally take years because of the bargaining 
power the lenders had over management through the DIP motion. When they 
prepared to try the claims to the judge, they found the claims settled out from 
under them by management, who did not pretend they had sought “the highest 
possible settlement,” but rather a settlement that would protect the company and 
its employees—a factor that mattered to the judge. Under the pressure of that 
standard, the Official Committee was forced to settle the claim for about 15 
percent of what they might have obtained had they won in court. 
IV. 
ADJUDICATING CONTROL OPPORTUNISM IN THE NEW ERA OF GOVERNANCE OF 
DISTRESSED FIRMS 
As the case studies above suggest, debtor-creditor relations have declined 
in the years following Gheewalla. Well-established norms and patterns of 
behavior have been upset and broken, and basic standards of comity have 
devolved. This is to the overall detriment of the credit markets because lenders 
need to have predictable recovery expectations in order to provide ex ante credit. 
However, we believe that judges can do better without returning to a world 
of fiduciary duty shifting. Non-bankruptcy judges, including state court judges 
and federal judges, and bankruptcy judges each have a role to play in restoring 
predictability and order to distressed governance. Importantly, the changes we 
describe below are entirely under the control of judges and would not require 
significant legislation or major shifts in the law. They would simply have judges 
view managers of distressed firms with a practiced skepticism, recognizing that 
control opportunism might influence whatever it is management is trying to do. 
State court and federal judges adjudicating contract disputes should 
consider whether management’s proposed course of action is a reasonable, good-
faith display of business judgment that promises to maximize the value of the 
firm. Even in the absence of an explicit duty that shifts to creditors, many 
commentators and courts believe that managers continue to owe their fiduciary 
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duty in the first instance to the firm, not to shareholders directly.261 For an 
example of how this could work, consider the lawsuit filed by Cumulus’ Term 
Lenders. They sued asserting contract claims to block what they saw as a misuse 
of the revolving loan provision in the loan contract. While the court considered 
this as a contract case, it is easy to imagine how a fiduciary duty analysis could 
be grafted on top of it in a way that is consistent with Gheewalla and Quadrant. 
For example, the court could have considered the level of analysis that 
management undertook in connection with the exchange offer, as courts often do 
in investigating fiduciary duty claims and the applicability of the business 
judgment rule.262 Did Forest Oil’s board really think that the reconstituted 
merger with Sabine, heaping on all that legacy Sabine secured debt, would 
maximize the value of the firm and benefit the corporation as a whole? In 
performing this analysis, courts should attach highly limited value to the notion 
that avoiding bankruptcy benefits the corporation. Did PetSmart’s board really 
think that a dividend to its private equity sponsor would help a distressed firm 
already struggling under the weight of billions of dollars of debt? 
For fiduciary duty analysis in bankruptcy courts, Forest Oil offers an 
illustrative example.263 The court summarily dismissed the fiduciary claims as 
being inconsistent with the law after Gheewalla and Quadrant. But what if the 
court had instead believed that the management re-engineered the deal to 
purportedly evade the change of control covenant? Surely, this kind of conduct 
should, and could, raise judicial eyebrows. The judicial tendency, since 
Gheewalla, has been encouraging to debtors intending to evade contractual 
covenants to do things they had previously promised not to do. Maybe those ex 
ante promises should be taken more seriously in subsequent litigation. 
Importantly, we believe that management would be restrained if they knew 
they would be forced to justify their conduct under a judiciary inquiry with more 
bite. While a more aggressive application of the business judgment rule would 
not eliminate control opportunism, it would likely deter the most egregious cases. 
Additionally, fraudulent transfer litigation has been devalued as an 
insolvency remedy. This kind of action currently takes a very long time to 
litigate. While some of this reflects the state of affairs in the judiciary generally, 
courts should be mindful of litigation duration in scheduling hearings and ruling 
on fraudulent transfer motions. The slow-moving trains of justice have broader 
consequences than denying justice to a particular plaintiff. It emboldens the 
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entire private equity industry to extract excessive dividends from portfolio firms, 
knowing that it might take more than a decade to litigate the fraudulent transfer 
action, by which time every employee currently at the private equity firm will be 
gone. 
Similarly, we believe that bankruptcy judges need to be more assertive in 
the face of demands from management that certain liquidation is the only 
alternative to a course of action that benefits one stakeholder over another.264 
There is no reason to think that DIP financing would really dry up if bankruptcy 
judges announced they would not allow DIP financings to limit the investigative 
rights of unsecured creditors over purported fraudulent transactions. Similarly, 
there is limited empirical evidence supporting the view that firms need to emerge 
from Chapter 11 so quickly that there is not enough time to fully investigate an 
important fraudulent transfer claim. 
Bankruptcy judges should also be wary of procedural mechanisms like sale 
motions and motions to settle claims that strip unsecured creditors of due process 
rights. Information should be widely shared, and managers should never have 
the right to conceal the existence of “higher and better” bids. If the official 
committee of unsecured creditors receives permission to bring a cause of action, 
for example, the court should be loath to allow management the right to settle it 
over the official committee’s objection. 
Bankruptcy judges should also consider whether fraudulent transfer law 
needs to operate more aggressively, mindful of Gheewalla and the spate of 
opportunism since the financial crisis. For example, courts could consider 
whether technical aspects of fraudulent transfer law—such as the “collapsing 
doctrine”—should be applied in a more plaintiff-friendly way.265 Courts should 
also be skeptical of efforts to inoculate leveraged buyouts from challenges, such 
as round-trip transactions, that lack economic substance. To be sure, nothing we 
have described are major reforms, but they could create a significantly different 
boardroom decision-making environment for distressed firms. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we argued that the common law’s journey away from 
creditor protection was driven by the mistaken belief that creditors could protect 
themselves using contract and bankruptcy law. As the case studies above show, 
opportunistic managers are difficult to restrain with contracts even when the risk 
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of opportunism is identified and contracted for ex ante. The lawyers who 
represent large firms are simply too skilled in the perpetual cat-and-mouse game 
not to find loopholes and ways around even the best contractual language. 
Moreover, bankruptcy judges consider many policy goals, outside of creditor 
protection—like preserving firm value and maximizing employment—and these 
other goals often win when they compete with a creditor’s argument that 
management committed some pre-bankruptcy harm to creditors. 
However, as we outlined in Part IV, judges can do much more to help. A 
more aggressive application of the business judgment standard will force boards 
to think harder about their actions and do more to justify them. An adverse 
decision constraining control opportunism would likely go quite a way to chill 
this type of aggressive opportunism. Just as judges created the current system of 
distressed governance, so too can they recreate it. 
